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12 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
INTRODUCTION:
AN INAUGURAL ISSUE ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Kurt W. Rtfter
Guest Editor
With this issue Speaker and Gavel inaugurates what may become a
regular, quadrennial issue on the debates of the preceding presidential
campaign. This projection and this special issue are based upon three
assumptions: 1) presidential debates are important; 2) presidential debates
are likely to continue to occur; and 3) presidential debates are <»i unique
interest to students, scholars, and practitioners of argument—the sort of
people who read this journal.
None of these assumptions is universally accepted, with the possible
exception of the first. Anv instance of political communication viewed by
100 million (or even 50 million) voters during a presidential campaign by
its very nature becomes an important event. Presidential debates have
varied and will continue to vary in their (luality, their usefulness to voters,
and their political impact, but it seems unlikely that they will liecome un
important. Because presidential debates have been relatively unusual
events, one pcditical communication researcher has urged that "Icwer
Iresearchl resources should be expended on them in the luture. ' Happily,
such advice continues to be ignored. \ preliminarx' bibliography indicates
that since i960 some seven books and approximately 1(X) scholarly articles
have been published on presidential debates. Few ol these studies, how
ever have focused on the argumentative aspects of the debates.
Much more problematic is the question of whether presidential debates
will continue as a regular feature of presidential campaigns. A.s Rohert L.
Scott points out later in this issue, in one sense a presidential candidate
cannot not debate—he or she must at least debate about whether a debate
will occur. On the basic issue, however, the future is less clear. Certainly
debates are now viewed by both candidates and their advisors as vehicles
for challengers and as threats to an incumbent.- Despite tliis, the last two
incumbent presidents have agreed to debate—or, at least, they were unalue
to avoid a debate. An explanation to this contradiction may be found in the
difficult times now facing any president. After four years of strugglmg with
intractable problems, no incumbent is likely to be high enough in the
public opinion polls to be able to lUTOgantly refuse to debate.'' In fact our
experience with political debates has advanced to the point that Robert
Friedenberg has been able to predict the conditions under which a polit
ical debate will occur.'
Those who teach and practice debate and argumentation have not ex
pressed a universal interest in presidential debates, but there are indica-
Kurt Ritter is an Assistanl Professor of Speech and Dramatic Art at the University
of Missouri-Columbia. .
' Charles K. Atkin, "Political Campaigns: Mass Communication and Persuasion,
in Persuasion: S'ew Directions in Theonj and Research, eds. Michael E. RolofF and
Gerald R. Miller (Beverly Hills. Calif.; Sage Publications, 1980), p. 304.
« Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large—1980: The Election," The New Yorker
(Dec. 1. 1980), pp. 157-58. „ .
=« I borrow tliis line of argument from Charis E. Walker, cochairperson of the
1976 Debates Steering Committee. For Walker's discussion, see Austin Ranney,
ed.. The Past and Future of Presidential Debates (Washington, D.C.; American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), p. 51.
' See Robert V. Friedenberg, ""We Are Present Today tor the Purpose of Having
a Joint Discussion': The Conditions Reciuisite for Political Debates," Joumal of the
American Forensic Association, 16 (1979), 1-9. 4
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Hons that an important segment of the educational debate community is
turning its attention to political debates. The most striking e.\ample is the
role of M\!es Marte! in Ronald Reagati's campaign. Mattel, who is a pro
fessor of speech communication and a fonner debate coach, has detailed
the work of Reagan s Debate Task Force in which he played a major role.^
Debate educators have also been sought out b\ sponsors of debates to help
dcnise fair and useful debate formats. Mike Pfau of .Augustana College
{St)uth Dakota), for example, was instrumental in implementing a series
of televised debates involving candidates for the U.S. House of Represen-
tatix e and the U.S. Senate in the 1980 elections. In South Carolina, William
Strickland playeil a similar part in planning the Republican Presidential
Primary Debate which was sponsored bs the Universit\- of South Carolina
and the Columbia (S.C.) Newspapers, Inc., and was televised nation
ally on the Public Broadcasting System. A final bit of evidence on this
point comes from the American Forensic As.sociation which has created an
.\d Hoc Committee on Public Political Debate, chaired by Dorothy
Kirn Sorensen of the University' of Tennessee.
Whether the present special issue on the 1980 presidential debates be
comes an inaugural issue depends, of couise, on whether the foregoing
assumptions pro\e sound. In 1984 we will know.
The essays in this issue reflect a widespread research effort b\ those
involved in argumentation and debate. The introductory essays bv J. Jef-
fery Auer and Robert Weiss provide overviews of both presidential de!)ates
in general, and the place of the 1980 deliates in the 1980 campaign In
particular.
R(tbert Scott, .Myles Miutel, Patricia Rile> and Thomas Hollihan analyze
respectively; 1) the impact of the controversy over whether the candi
dates would debate at all; 2) the basic <leiiate strategy and specific
argumentative tactics of the Reagan camp; and .3) the types of statements
employed i>y John Antlerson, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan in the
(lebates as well as the types of issues they addressed.
The concluding section of this issue includes an e.xamination by David
Leuthold and David Valentine of why Reagan came to be regarded as the
winner of his debate with Carter. The issue concludes with a practical
question—how do the various formats for televised political debates
iiffect tlie debates themselves? This comparative study by Susan Hell-
weg and Steven Phillips is particularly rich in information because
the> examine three debates from the Republican priniiuy elections as well
as the two major tlebates in Baltimore and Cleveland.
This special issue would not have been possible without the support of
a number of people and institutions. The present editor of Speaker and
CavcL Bill Balthrop, not only enthusiastically supported the idea of a spe
cial issue, but willingK provided the guest editor with the authority nec
essary to carry out the project. The Department of Spec'ch and Dramatic
Art at the Unixersity of Missouri—C^olmnbia provided office supplies, du
plicating serx ices and related support, including the c(jst of a computer-
assisted bibliography on presidential debates. The Graduate School and
Office of Research at the University of Missouri-Columbia eased the task
of the guest editor by providing a Summer Research Felloxx ship. Finally,
the most important supporters of the issue xxere the contributors—both
those xvhose essays are included here ami others. The response to the call
for essays was so great that for each essay accepted, five other manuscripts
had to be turned away. To all, thank xou.
* See MartelLs essay, "Debate Preparations in the Reagan Camp; An Insider's
View," in this issue of Speaker and Gavel. 5
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GREAT MYTHS ABOUT THE GREAT DEBATES
J. JEFFERY AUER
In what appears retrospectively to have been a moment of unwarranted
euphoria, a volume of studies reporting on the joint press conferences of
Richard Nixon and John Kennedy in the I960 presidential campaign was
titled The Great Debates.' A subseciuent volume devoted to the similar
undertakings of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter in 1976 bore the same
title.'^ In 1980, no doubt, plans were made for a third volume, intended to
deal with the televised programs of dialogue between selected Journalists
and Jimmv Carter, Ronald Reagan, and whomever. But the collapse of the
original best laid plans of the League of Women Voters iti 1980, even more
than the perfonnances in 1960 and 1976, revealed to all that the so-called
great debates are in fact based upon great myths. In any report on what
took place in 1980 (and especially when addressed to readers ot a forensic
society journal) it seems appropriate at the outset to explore four of the
myths that shroud the subject.
The first myth is that the tnesidential debates were debates at ally great
or small. In the American political tratlition, in judicial procedure, and in
collegiate forensics, debate has five es.sential elements. Debate is (1) a
confrontation, (2) in equal and adecpiate time, (3) of matched contestants,
(4) on a stated proposition, (5) to gain an audience decision. The "presi-
denUal debates" of 1960 and 1976 had little resemblance to that tradition,'
and a quick review of 1980 reveals common shortcomings in their fonnats.
(1) Except in the sense that both debaters were on the same platform at
the same time, there was no direct confrontation. At best, the prefaces to
three of Reagan's responses showed that he had listened to Carter: That
is a mi.sstatement of course, of my position." "Well, that just i.sn't tnie.
"There you go again."' The only real confrontation was between candidate
and journalist (juestioner, slightly abrasive when syndicated columnist
Daniel Greenberg instnicted Reagan and Anderson that "the panel and
audience would appreciate responsiveness to the (juestions rather than
repetitions of your campaign addresses." and a little reprimanding when
ABC's Barbara Walters pronounced that "neither candidate answered spe-
cificallv the question of a specific policy . . . ." In any case, students of
debate will recall that it was Lincoln who posed the questions to Douglas
at Freeport, and not some itinerant jounialist.
J. Jeftery Auer is a Profes.sor of Speech Communication at Indiana Universitx' and
editor-elect of Speaker and Gavel.
Copyright 1980 b\ J. JeiTery Auer.
' Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Background—Perspective—Effects [Ken-
nedy-Nixonl (Bloomington: Indiana Universit>' Press, 1962).
2 Sidney Kraus. ed.. The Great Debates: Carter vs. Ford, 1976 (BKiomington:
Indiana University Press, 1979).
" See J. Jeffer.' Auer, "The Counterfeit Debates," in Kraus, The Great Debates
(Kennedy-Nixon), pp. 142-50; and Lloyd Bitzer and Theodore Rueter, Carter vs.
Ford: The Counterfeit Debates of 1976 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1980), pp. 5-13.
' All references to the 1980 debates are to the complete texts of Reagan-Anderson,
Sew York Times, 23 Sept. 1980, pp. 8-9, and Carter-Reagan. New York Times, 30
Oct. 1980, pp. 15-18.
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(2) Moderators Bill Moyers and Howard K. Smith were careful timekeep
ers, and contesting candidates had equal time. But no thoughtful observer
could describe as adequate the time given to candidates for dealing with
questions. Reagan and Anderson each had two and a htilfminutes for their
initial responses, and one minute and fifteen seconds for second responses.
(This was no improvement over 1960: the comparable times for Nixon and
Kenneds were three minutes and one minute.) It was hardly reasonable
to think that within these constraints either man could deal adequately
with specifics on how to attack inflation, meet energy shortages, or save
the cities. Indeed, it is hiuardous for public thinking to create the'illusion
that such problems can be "handled" in 225 seconds.
(3) In 1960 and 1976 it was eas\' to say that the debates involved matched
confestattis. but whether this was true in 1980 depended upon how you
defined your tenns. Certainly all three participants in the Baltimore and
Cleveland events were men ol some experience in the public discussion
ol political issues, but only one of them was privy to the information and
insight that goes with the Oval Office, and only one of them had practiced
being "presidential." Moreover, it should be noted that the hvo events did
not match all contestants: to Baltimore came only two of the three who
hacl been invited, and by the time of Cleveland one of these had been
disinvited. From the beginning, tjf course, there were a couple of dozen
other candidates selected b\ their parties, but clearly not acceptable for
the debates. These included Barry Commoner of the Citizen's Pait>-; Ed
Clark, Libertarian; and David McReynolds, Socialist. .McRevnolds argued
that the Sociali.st party was in a "Catch-22" situation: with'less than five
percent of the popular vote it could receive no federal funds; without fun<ls
it was denied access to television (and could not be invited by the League
to share its "free' time); and without television it could never gain even
a five percent following.' But it was John Anderson who protested most
when, after having been invited to Baltimore, he was biured from Cleve
land because he had dropped to less than the League's cut-off poll figure
of fifteen percent. He called upon "the court of public opinion to express
the outrage that I feel over being excluded."'^ His wife, Keke, proclaimed
that "Roosevelt had the New Deal, Truman had the Fair Deal and John's
gotten the ra\x deal. ^ But it was to no avail. Even though the recognized
polling expert, Albert H. Cantril, argued that polls deal with probabilities
ami not with the kind of "objective" data that the League assumed," An
derson lost his viability as a candidate and his qualifications for the
debate.
(4) Of course there was an implicitly stated proposition : Resolved that
this house favors candidate X for the presidency. Indeed, there was a
second one implied in 1960, 1976, and 1980: that the ability to give facile
and convincing answers to press conference questions demonstrates a can
didate's qualifications to be president. Even forensic freaks would find it
hard to prove that one. In tact, of course, there were no propositions for
debate, but only questions for quick answers (hesitating before replying,
perhaps even to think of something sensible to say, has alwavs been con
sidering a sign of weakness in these situati{)ns). The questions stood in
isolation, unlinked to what went before, and with no logical progression.
^New York Times, 4 Sept. 1980, p. EI9.
Lvuisvilh' Cnurier-jounxal, 18 Oct. 1980, p. A3.
^ Bloomington Herald-Telephone, 26 Oct. 1980 p 3
NVt'u; Ver/c Tmie-v, 7 Sept. 1980, p. E19.
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Look for the unity, coherence and emphasis in this sequence of topics
thrust at Carter and Reagan: military power, inflation, urban decline, hos
tages in Iran, arms limitation treaty, energy and oil, social security system,
and perceived weaknesses of his opponent. The very format of the en
counters randomized tlie subjects to be discussed, but beyond that, re
ported Soma Golden, editorial writer for the New York Times, when pre
paring to question Reagan and Anderson "I felt under enormous pressure
to try framing a single question that would somehow catch the well-briefed
candidates by surprise on a subject of importance."" Golden's question
really turned into a discourse of 124 words, fewer than the record of a 153-
word question b\' Newsweek's Jane Bryant Quinn; but even the shortest
question that night, by Lee May, Los Angeles Times reporter, was 72
words. For the record, the format of tlie Carter-Reagan perfonnance was
improved by pennitting follow-up <iuestions, and all questions seemed
sharper in concept, though still prolix.
(5) As was said of tlie 1960 and 1976 meetings, so in 1980: neither par
ticipant could gain a decision from his listeners upon thoughtful consid
eration of issues because the format itself encouraged instant reactions,
not developed arguments. Particularly in 1980, moreover, each contestant
demonstrated the "straight rebuttal" approach at its worst; the emphasis
was negative, picking away at the opponent's record, questioning probity,
and searching for fatal flaws in factual assertions, all the while doubtless
hoping to provoke a blunder to rival Ford's 1976 declaration of Rumanian,
Yugoslavian and Polish independence from the Soviet Union.
In identifying as a myth the notion that "presidential debates in any
way resemble debates in the American political tradition, one is not obliged
to propose a return to the 19th century confrontations of Webster vs, Hayne
or Lincoln vs. Douglas. Indeed, it could be argued, if space were available,
that this would present a standard of excellence beyond the demonstrated
capacity of more than tvi-o or three presidential candidates in the 20th
centur>'. What is urged is that in the process of looking at the 1980 "pres
idential debates" as debates there were obvious weaknesses and con
straints in their non-debate format.
The second inylh is thai the presidential debates evolved from the desire
of the candidates to inform the electorate about critical political issues.
If this m\ th can be traced to one man, he is Richard Nixon. Writing in
1961 about his debates with Kennedy in 1960, Nixon concluded that "joint
TV appearances of candidates at the presidential level are here to stay,
mainly because people want them and the candidates have a responsibilih'
to inform the public on their views before the widest possible avidience.""'
The myth was supported by Robert Samoff, in 1960 board chainnan of the
National Broadcasting CoriDoration (NBC): "'The Great Debate [a tenn
that apparently he coined] will become a lasting political institution that
will reinforce the vigor of our country's democratic heritage in the chal-
^Netv York Titnes, 24 Sept. 1980, pt. 4, p. 20.
Richard M. Nixon. Six Crises (Garden City. NY; Doubleday, 1962), p. 357. With
the perspective of the years, however, and writing after the Ford-Carter debates of
1976, Nixon granted that "1 doubt that they can ever serve a responsible role in
defining the issues of a presidential campaign. Because of the nature of the medium,
there will inevitably be a greater premium on showmanship than on statesmanship."
Richard M. Nixon, RN; The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Cresset & Dun-
lap, 1978), p. 221.
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lenging years diead."" Frank Stanton, president in 19fiO oi the Columbia
Broadcasting S\ stem (CBS), saw the myth threatened 1)> the argument that
an incumbent president would never agree to debate, but concluded that
it was irrelevant since the debates were not to sen-e "the interests of the
candidates" but "the best interests of the voters." It would be "incredible
cynicism to think that "the people were entitled to sec and hear candi
dates in facc-to-face discus.sions only when it served the political interests
of a candidate. This view was made ofBcial b\' the blessing of Walter
Lippmann who wrote in I9f)() that "Irom now on it will be impossible for
any candidate ... to avoid this kind of confrontation with his opponent.""
Despite the failure to hold debates in 1964, and before the Ni.\on victory
elections in 1968 and 1972, the mytli was not substantial!) weakened. After
all, innocents asked, was not the villain a Congress that refused to make
them possible b\- repealing or waiving Section 31.5 of tlie Communication
Act that eftecti\ely barred debates limited to two candidates? By 1976 a
way had been found to make Section 315 action unnecessary, provided
that a private agency sponsored the debates ami the networks covered
them as news events." Thus the League of Women Voters came to spon
sor and finance Ford and Carter in debate as its major effort to direct
national focus upon "Issues not Images in Election *76."" While Sander
Vanocur called the result an unnatural act between two consenting adults
in public, the League president s (»nly worries were expressed in an
article entitled "Will Success Spoil the League of Women Voters?"'" And
the myth went on.
The carefully structured myth came unstuck when Carter declined to
participate in the debate arranged by the League of Women Voters for
Baltimore on Septeinber 21. Reagan contributed his own classic of political
piety in response; "The new Jimmy Carter would rather campaign in the
safety and isolation ()f the Rose Garden instead of submitting himself and
his sorry record to the examination of the other candiilates and the scrutiny
of the American people. I am sorry and I am angry and the American
people also will be. " Anderson, whose lu)pe for a legitimized candidacy
rested heavily upon a joint appearance with the president, appeared naive
when he told a press conference on September 9 that he couldn't believe
Carter had made his owji ilecision, that it must have been the advice of
his campaign advisers "who are looking at this as a purely political
thing. Honest Robert Strauss, Carter's campaign chairman, acknowl
edged that whether to debate or not to debate was a bald political decision:
"We have our selfish reasons. Reagan has his selfish interests," he said on
the NBC> 1 oday show. "We all have our selfish interests. Let's rlon't kid
" In a si>eech to (he San Francisco Advertising Club, Oct. .5. 1960, quoted in
Kraus, The Greul Debates (Kennetly-Ni.son), p- 64.
" In a speec h to Sigma Delta Chi, .New York, Dec. 3, I960, quoted in Kraus, The
Great Debates (Kennedy-Nixon), p. 71.
"NVic York Herald Tribwie. 29 Sept. 1960, p. 26.
The 76 Presidential Debates,' The National Voter (League of Women Voters),
Fall 1976, p. 1.
'®On a Public Broadcasting System (PBS) broadcast following the third Ford-
Carter debate, Oct. 22, 1976.
The Naliomil Viiler (League of Women Voters), Fall 1976, p. 6
"New York Times, 11 Sept. 1980, p. 1.
Bloomitifilon (Indiana) Herald-Telephone. 11 Sept. 1980, p. 3.
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18 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
ourselves." Reagan wanted Anderson in the debate, Strauss argued, be
cause Anderson would draw as many as six votes from Carter for every one
he took from Reagan.^®
An e(iual amount of self-interest lay behind Reagan s repeated charge
that Carter was afraid to debate and was making excuses for not debating.^"
Members of his stall' were candid about tlie basis for their own views on
debating, summed up by one wim referred to a Carter-Reagan debate as
"one big crapshoot that could blow it all," and warned newsman Hedrick
Smith, "Don't expect to see us in a debate unless the polls change and the
race gets too close for comfort.""' One Carter aide had said earlier about
the whole delnite issue, "It's turned into gamesmanship—who's going to
blink first,"" and on October 17 Reagan shifted strategy and agreed to a
broadcast with Carter alone, it was a victory for the hawks in the Reagan
camp who had long felt that "if the gviy can't debate Jimmy Carter for one
hour, maybe we're all making a mistake."" When the Reagan campaign
showed need of rejuvenation, noted competent observers, it was time to
trv for "a big roll of the dice.""
The League of Women Voters clung to its ideals: "[we] did not attempt
to sponsor a series of 1980 Presidential Debates in order to please the
candidates, win the approval of political commentators or amuse the videojunkies. Our purpose was, pure and simple, to serve the American pub
lic."" But the purpose of Carter, Reagan and Ajiderson was to serve their
own political ends.
The third miith is that presidential debates have made critical changes
in voter decisions upon the issues. Even though the governing term here
is "critical changes," it is difficult to find an objective assessment of debate
impact upon \'oting behavior. The candidates always tend to be generous
in self-appraisal, especially when they win the election. Kennedy said, "it
was TV more than anything else that turned the tide"; and Carter in 1976
acknowledged that "I have a feeling that, had it not been for the debates,
I would have lost."" The voters themselves tend to judge by seeing how
well their prior opinions held up, and thus their innate resistance to change
is a filtering factor. Media critics concern themselves primarily with who
won?" and cover the events in the idiom of the newspaper sports page.
Communication scholars are more concerned with the dynamics ol the
situation and with measurable attitude shifts, although in 1960 thirteen out
of thirty-one such studies also included a "who won.'^ " dimension.^^
Blooiuington (Indiana) Herald-Telephone, 10 Sept. 1980, p. 1; and New York
Times, 9 Sept. 1980, p. 8.
'°New York Times, 12 Sept. 1980, p. 8.
" New York Times, 19 Oct. 1980, p. IE.
".Veic York Times, 9 Sept. 1980, p. 8.
New York Times, 23 Sept. 1980, p. 6.
Hedrick Smith, "Reagan ... Agrees to Debate Carter Alone," New York Times,
18 Oct. 1980, p. 1; and Jack Nelson (of the Los Angeles Times), "Reagan Agrees to
Meet Carter in Crucial Debate." reprinted in the Louisville Courier-Journal, 18
Oct. 1980, pp. A2, A18.
"Ruth J. Hinerfeld, "The 1980 Presidential Debates: Setting the Record
Straight," The National Voter (League of Women Voters), Fall 1980, p. 1.
" Kennedy quoted in Theodore H. White, The Making of the Presulent, W6()
(New York: .Atheneum, 1961), p. 294; and Carter quoted in the New York Times, 7
Nov. 1976, p. 38.
" Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman, "The Debates in the Light of Research: A
Survey of Surveys," in Kraus, The Creat Debates (Kennedy-Nixon), pp. 178-183.
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These academic critics are agreed, however, on what happens to issues.
In 1960 the debates .seem to have (a) made some issues salient rather
than others (the issues made salient, of course, may or may not have been
the most important ones); (b) caused some people to learn where the
candidules stand (including the .stand of the opposition candidate); (c) ef
fected ver>- few changes of opinion on the issues; and (d) focused more on
presentation and personaiit)- tlian on issues."-" A summary of scholarK*
assessments in 1976 indicated that it was less of an image-based election,
and that "the Ford-Carter debates produced ver\- little evidence of image
enhancement.. .. A voter's perception of a candidate as a 'good guy"
.seems to be detennined heavily by which side of the issue the candidate
Is on. On the other hand, more than half the press coverage was about
the debates, but not of the debates themselves."^" Thus the issues of the
debates were downplayed and the image.s of the candidates a.s performers
were emphasized.
The Carter-Reagan debate offered little support for the nn th of issue
centrality. This is a conclusion made, of course, without benefit of the
kinds of empirical studies done in the 1960 and 1976 debates, but it is
assumed that when they come they will be in agreement. The conclusion
is based, in part, upon an anaK sis of post-debate commentaries bv more
than fifty political observers, journalists, debate coaches, and rhetorical
critics, as reported in the press (hiring the week after the debate. Only a
handful of these analysts referred to issues, and then to matters on which
Carter challenged Reagan's position, Reagan responded that lie was being
misrepresented, and the matter was then dropped. There was a tendency
on the part of a few to call "issues" matters that were really image-bound
and reflected candidate posture rather than principle. The first of these
was the continued effort by Carter to create an image of Reagan as "dan
gerous" on matters of war and peace. The second was Reagan's effort to
create contrasting images to show the failure of Ciu"ter's economic policies:
.\re you iietter off now than you were four years ago?" The wa>' the great
majority of these critics saw the debate was reHected in their pervasive
comments on these (juestions: Who seemed most presidential? Who had
the best grasp of the facts? Who appeared to be most fallible? Who had
the best stage presence? Did either one commit a gaffe? Did Reagan look
"dangerous?" Did Carter seem credible?
A panel of seven directors of forensics, polled b\ the Associated Press
on a I-.5 point ballot for each of si.\ debatiiig criteria, came out with a total
of 161 points for Reagan, 160 for Carter.'" This result paralleled the finding
in an Associated Press public opinion poll completed within eighty min
utes after the debate: twelve percent of the pre-debate undecideds split
six and six for the candidates after the debate, leaving another twelve still
undecided." These hvo judgments of the debate seem reasonable in re-
Katz and Feldinan. "The Debates in the Light of Research," p. 203,
■■''Steven H. ChalTee and Jack Davis. "Presidential Debates: An Empirical As
sessment, in Austin Ranney, ed.. The Past and Futiin- of Presidential Debates
(Washington; .American Enteqirise Institute for Public Police Research, 1979) pp
78, 84-85. Also see David (). Sears and Steven H. Chaffee. "Uses and Effects of the
1976 Debates: An Overview of Empirical Studies," in Kraus, The Great Debates
(Carter-Ford), pp. 223-61.
^'Indianapolis News, 29 Oct. 1980, p. 17.
Indianapolis Star, 30 Oct. 1980, p. 1.
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fleeting a near standoff. But in that case Reagan was really the winner
simply because he survived the debate. As Anthony Lewis put it, Reagan
always stood to gain from a debate with the President if he just sta> ed in
the ring. He did that, avoiding any major slip, and those inclined to vote
for him were no doubt reassured."'- What reassured them, to keep the
pugilistic figure, was the impression he gave of being able to stand up to
his oppjnent. He was the classic defensive boxer, maintaining his cool
and sticking to his basic fight plan. In short, his image was that ot a can
didate playing the role of a deliberately genial and smoothly competent
challenger, adroitly fending off or evading his opponent's grim-taced at
tacks, and counter-punching just often enough to satisfy his fans.
Jimmy Carter had said that the question was who would make the best
president. "It's not a contest to see who's the best debater or the best
orator or the most professional television perfonner."" But it turned out
that it was just that kind of a contest; and this meant that it was one in
which the image of best debater/orator/performer was more important than
anv issue.
As questionable as these three myths are, it may seem surinising that
they have sustained "presidential debates" in three campaigns. But these
myths, in turn, have depended for much of their vitality upon still one
more myth.
The fourth myth is that presidential candidates ivill someday volun-
tariht and regularly participate in real debates. We have already argued
that in three campaigJis the absence of traditional forensic elements made
the "presiilential debates" less effective than they might have been, that
candidates took part even in these limited-format affairs only when it
seemed to be politically expedient, and that the effect was more to create
images that) to illuminate issues. But despite this, those who believe in
the tooth iiiirs' will also find it possible to believe that one day all presi
dential canditlates will voluntarily and regularly, and cheerfully, take part
in real presidential debates.
The se<iuence t)f events relating to debates in the 1980 campaign belies
this optimistic conclusion. First, Reagan believed that he was running
ahead of his Republican opponents, and refused to debate them in Iowa
before the primary. Second, Carter though he was ahead in the polls, re
fused to debate Teddy Kenned\ in the Democratic primaries, even when
Kennedy offered to withdraw from the race no matter how the debate
turned out. Third, Carter refused to debate with Reagan and Anderson,
despite having made what the League of Women Voters regarded as a "no-
strings-attached promise," unless he could first debate Reagan head-to-
head!" Fourth, Reagan declined to take part in a debate witli Carter and
without Anderson, believing that Anderson woulil help him and hurt Car
ter, but he did debate Anderson without Carter. Fifth, on October 14, with
Carter gaining ground in the polls aiid Reagan stagnating, Carter s strate
gists, according to Jod.v Powell's later report, felt that "a debate could only
hurt us," and devised a strateg\ to ensure Reagan's refusal to debate: an
ultimatum that unless Reagan agreed to debate Carter idone by the end of
that week, there would be no debate." Sixth, before that ultimatum could
be delivered, the League reversed itself on Anderson, declared that he was
New York Times, 30 Oct. 1980, p. 29. James Baker. Reagan's debate negotiator,
had said, "We don't have to win. We don't have to tie. A close loss is a plus for us
because people expect more of the president. " Louisville Courier-Journal, 28 Oct.
1980, p. A3.
^ Louisville Courier-Journal, 18 Oct. 1980, p. .Al.
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"not a viable candidate," and invited Carter and Reagan to debate alone.
Reagan at once accepted and Carter had no politically defensible choice
but to agree to what he had all along said he wanted. FinalK', Anderson
called "foul" at being left out; but there is no evidence that he ever re-
.spondcd to a similar request from Ed Clark, Libertarian candidate, for an
Anderson-Clark dei)ate. In short, the 1980 stoiy revealed candi<lates who
were willing to debate only if they were not ahead in the polls, or were
ahead but losing momentum, and needed n lift for their campaigns.
The conclusion to be drawn from this account, as the League of Women
Voters should be the first to testify, is that high ideals, well-laid plans,
candidate promises, and a ralh ing of public opinion are not enough to
explode this myth. The only way to ensure debates of any sort between
presidential candidates in 1984 and after is to find a way to mandate them.
Whether Americans really want to command presidential aspirants to de
bate or engage in other televised forensic competition is anodier tjuestion,
but it is one that should be examined careful!\- by everyone who is con
cerned about the nature of politics and the quality of candidates.
Those who are interested in forgetting the myths and getting on with
making presidential debates a reality alreadv have a series of useful anal
yses and proposals to examine.'''^ They range from suggestions for simple
supplication to withholding federal presidential campaign funds from
tlrose who do not debate. The\ also deal with such details as possible
formats, focus on issues, audience, the role—if any—for a panel of (jues-
tioners, and general management of a sequence of forensic events, perhaps
including fonnal debates, long interviews, press conferences, ami citizen
interrogations.
Members of Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa .Alpha and all those who have
had first-hand opportunities to observe the efficacy of debate as a tool of
a democratic societx should take the lead in exploring ways and means of
iliscartling the myths and making presidential debates a realitx- in future
campaigns.
Posfscri))l: After this article w-as set into type the League of Wonjen
\'oters (LWV) announced (in The National Voter, Winter 1981, pp.
6-9) that it will seek, through a series of public bearings over the
next two years, 'the broadest possible input of ideas and viewpoints"
about "improving and institutionalizing presidential (lebates as a tool
in the election system.' Readers of this journal possess an unusual
uuderstaiiding of the purpo.se.s and processes of debate and it should
certainly be made available to the LW\'. They should contact the
presidents of local and state Leagues to see when and where the
public hearings are to be held and how tliey can be among those
called to testify.—J. J. A.
'".Veu- York Timen, 9 Nov. 1980. p. 14.
"See George F. Bishop, Robert G. .Meadow and Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, eds..
The Pri'siiU'iitia! Debatr.i: Media, Elccloral, and Policy Peripectives (New York,
Praeger, 1978); Lloytl Bitzer and Tlieodore Rueter, Carter vs. Ford-, Govermnent
Printing Office. The Presidential Catnpaian, 1976. Vol. 3: The Debates (Washing
ton: 1979); Kraus The Great Debates (Kennedy-Ni.son); Kraiis, The Great Debates-
(Carter-Ford); Newton N. Minow. John Bartlow Martin and Lee M. Mitchell, Pres
idential Television (New York: Ba.sic Books, 197.3); Ranney, Past and Future  ,- Twcmi-
tielh Centnry Fund, VV7//i the Nation Wutchina: Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Televised Presidential Debates (Lexington. Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1979).
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THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES IN THEIR POLITICAL
CONTEXT: THE ISSUE-IMAGE INTERFACE IN
THE 1980 CAMPAIGN
Robert O. Weiss
The study of political campaign communication has been dominated,
almost bewitched, by the dialectic of is-suc and image, a bewitchment
which is reflected in journalistic essays, in a great body of fonnal research,
and even in this symposium.
The concepts of issue and image frequently manifest themselves as pohir
extremities. On the one hand we are given the <iuintessential image can
didate, character and personality undiluted by any particular issue posi
tion; on the other hand we find the disembodied issue candidate, a series
of position papers somehow given voice without character. Likewise,
scholarly partisans become polarized, eagerly monitoring the latest flurry
of studies from outlying academic precincts projecting now issues, now
images, as the principal determinants of voter behavior.'
In any event, our aim here is to utilize these presumably antithetical
tenns in investigating the recently concluded 1980 Presidential campaign
and especially the highlight of the campaign, the presidential debates. To
do this, we will extend our examination to incorporate something every
body actually realizes—that issues and images are in practical fact inter
locked and that they intertwine in all manner of convolutions and mutually
affect one another in countless ways. The alliterative label we will affix to
this relationship is the "issue-image interlace."
This analysis will look at the issue-image interface as it manifests itself
in the discourse of the candidates. A rationale for studying the candidates'
images by means of an examination of speech texts (rather than, say, public
opinion polls) is provided by Thomas D. Clark.* The campaign and debate
discourse will be made to reveal some ol the ways in which issue and
image elements served one another for the major candidates.
The primary phenomena we will examine are the image implications of
issue controversies. Briefly we will also consider possible issue implica-
ions of image controversies as well as the issue-image implications of
certain rhetorical substructures. We will conclude with specific treatment
of the Carter-Reagan television debate."
Robert O. Weiss is Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences, DePauw Uni
versity, and is a past editor of Speaker and Gavel.
' For summaries of research on candidate images versus political issues as influ
ences in elections, see Dan Nimmo, Political Commumcation and Public Opinion
in America (Santa Monica, Calif.: Coods ear Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 380-
82; Dan Nimmo and Robert L. Savage, Candidates and Their linages: Concepts,
Methods, and Findings (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Company,
1976), pp. 188-91; and Dan Nimmo, "Political Image Makers and the .Mass Media,"
Anfifl/s of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 427 (Sept. 1976),
pp. .33^4,
^ Thomas D. Clark, "An Exploration of Generic Aspects of Contemporary Amer
ican Campaign Orations," Central States Speech Journal, 30 (1979), 122-33.
® For studies of how previous presidential debates have in'fluenced candidate
images and campaign issues, see Jack Dennis, Steven H. Chaflee, and Sun Yuel
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The Reagan-Carter "Warm-Up Debate" on Foreign Policy:
Image Implications of Issue Controversies
Whether or not a candidate deliheratcK uses an issue as a "vehicle" for
conveying an image, once he is drawn into an issue dispute he generates
substantial reverberations among the traits composing the image he has
established. These reverberatiojis or elfects may be seen as (a) being con
tained in the implied warrants and (b) being directly associated, explicit
self-references in the speech.
For piuposes ol analysis we will take a fortuitous "wann-up" debate of
sorts which developed because both Governor Reagan and President Car
ter chose to present nationwide paid political broadcasts on the issue of
foreign polics' Sunday, October 19. Reagan's was a 3()-minute televised
address and Carter's a 15-miuute radio talk.
We refer to Reagan first. As an "issues" speech, Reagan's address rested
upon ke\ contentions that "we must build peace upon strength" and that
"our economic, military and strategic strength under President Carter is
eroding."' These contention.s were supported with a nine-step program
designed to "put America on a secure footing in the intcriiatiojial arena."
The ninth step, designated as "perhaps the most important {tf all," was to
"restore the margin of safet> for peace in our delen.se program." The
warrant was simply that a margin of safets , an apparent superiority, is the
guarantor ol peace, a po,sition which implies a personalit>' or image com
ponent as well as a rationale lor the person making it, a "king on the
mountain" premise that stability is maintained by being "number one."
In spite of relatively moderate language and a modification of prior po
sitions, Reagan's discourse reflected a person who was coinmitted to a
belligerent and superior position as a necessary personalit>' trait. In order
to maintain integrity on the foreign policy issue, Reagau was fundamen
tally unable in this address to moilify the image of belligerence. If any
thing, it was reinforced. B\- Wednesda\ of the following week, both NBC
News aiul CBS News reported the abandonment ol the foreign policy area
by Reagan to emphasize other matters.
The image-producing capacity ol an issue-oriented message is estal)-
lisheil not only b\ the warrants siipporting the basic claims, hut also by
the more direct and personal references placed into immediate association
with them. The veiy opening remark of Reagan's television address in this
instance was the ingenuous passage, "I'd like to speak to you now, not as
a candidate for the Presidency, hut as a citizen, a parent, in fact, a gruncl-
Choe, "Impact on Partisan, Image, and Issue Voting." The Great Debates: Carter
vs. Ford. 1976. ed. Sidney Kraiis (Bloomington; Indiana Universih, Press, 1979), pp.
314-30; Herbert W. Simons and Kenneth Leihowitz, "Shifts in Canditlate Images,"
The Great Debates (Carter vs. Ford), pp. 39b--I04; Perccy H. Tannenhaum, Bradley
S. Greenl)erg, and Fred H. Silvennan, "Candidate Images," in The Great Debates:
Baekgroinnl-Pcrspective'Effects. ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sit>' Press, 1962), pp. 27I-B8; Lee B. Becker, Idown A. Sohowale. Robin E. Cohbey,
and Chaini H. Eyal, "Debates EITects on Voters' Undcrstaiuling of Candidates and
Issues," The Presidential Debates: Media. Electoral, and Polict/ Perspectives, eds.
George F. Bishop. Robert G. Meadow, and Marilyn Jackson-Beeck (New York: Prae-
ger, 1978), pp. 126—39; and Dan Nininio, Michael Mansfield, and James Curry,
"Persistance of Change in Candidate images." The Presidential Debates, pp. 140-
56.
* This and other passages from Reagan s televised speech (unless otherwise noted)
are from the Neic York Times, 20 Get. 1980, p. DIG.
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parent, who shares with you the deep and abiding hope for peace." The
role of "parent, in fact, a grandparent" served the purpose of reinforcing
the associated traits of judgment, maturit\% nurturing and ciU'ing.
Even the core passage in which Reagan's opposition to SALT II was
apparently tempered by an acceptance of SALT III was personalized: "I
have repeatedly said in this campaign that I will sit down with the Soviet
Union for as long as it takes to negotiate . . . Reagan professed patience
both with the IlKtener who may have missed that repetition and with the
Soviets as well. Role identification and trait dramatization constitute two
of the methods of associating personal traits with issues even in messages
in which the issues m-e the presumable central concern.
President Carter, in his l5-minute foreign policy radio address the same
Sunda\', centered on the contention that the SALT II Treat)' "strengthens
our strategic position."® The primar>' supporting idea was that this treat)
represents the "extremely important process . . . r)f gradually reducing the
possibility of nuclear war." Throughout the argument the listener found
an emphasis on process, on gradual change, the steps taken in "the last 20
years," the seven years of negotiation and instances of diplomatic success.
Carter announced with approval: "We've rejected the counsels of pessi
mism and have dared to make progress toward peace." The image of the
patient negotiator is embetlded in the discourse, reinforced with an at
tempt to contrast this position with the more precipitous "nuclear arms
race." Carter's image as a patient negotiator was somewhat tarnished in
this address by the constraints of issue development when his de.scription
of the "steady building of our defenses" painted a vision of Soviet inten
tions and capacities which was, if anything, more threatening than the one
presented by Reagan. The negotiator was just a little paranoid himself.
The incorporation of personal references in association with the issues,
the second method for developing (or contradicting) an image in an issue
speech, also was apparent in the Carter speech, most notabi)' in his contrast
between the spirit of negotiation and the aspiration to nuclear superiority:
"I've had four ) ears of sobering experience in this life-and-death field and
in my considereil judgment this would be a ver)' risky gamble." The pos-
sibilit)' of nuclear war, he said, "as president is something that 1 think
about every da)' and every iright of rn) life."*' The theme of presideirtial
shepherding apperu-ed again in the self-references which (in cotrjunctron
with issue support) ser\ed to reinforce the character trait of the "stable
leader" which pervaded this discourse.
The Campaign Context of the Reagan-Carter TV Debate:
Issue Implications of Image Controversies
If we examitre the issue-inrage interface from the other directioir, we
find that controversies which appeiu" to focus on inrage elements directly
will also contain issue components which are difficult to separate fnmr
them. We observe, for instance, the "role reversal" flap which came to a
head in early October, when Carter (who had been trying to make Reagan
appear harsh) began himself to acquire a "mean streak" label.
Carter was apparently making an effort to exhibit stronger and more
» This and other passages from Carter's radio speech (unle.ss otherwise noted) are
from the New York Times, 20 Oct. 1980, p. DIO.
^Baltimore Sun,,.,; Putnam County (Indiana) Banner-Graphic. 20 Oct. 1980, p.
A2.
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aggressive personality traits in cam'ing the fight to the opposition, a tactic
which led to the well-publicized statement in Cliicago on October 6 that
if he lost the election, "Americans might be separated, black from white.
Jew Irom Christian, Nortli from South, rural from urban," and "ouratlver-
saries be tempted to end the peace for which we all pray."'
One cannot make a strong statement without being strong about some
thing; the sociological overtones of the issues of racism, the Moral Major
ity, an<l of the threat of war seemed well-suitetl to reinforce the nature of
the attack, but unfortunately they suggested that Carter possessed the trait
of "meanness" as well.
Reagan's choice was to express muted feelings; "1 can't be angrv. I'm
saddened .... 1 m not asking for an apology from him. I know who I have
to account to tor my actions. But I think he owes the counti\' an apologx'.""
After that, Carter felt constrained to be penitent, granted Barbara Walters
an interview, antl admitted, "The tone of the campaign has departed from
the way it ought to be .... I'll tr\' to make sure that it is better in the
future.""
The effect, not necessarily permanent, was to deflect the issues associ
ated with the original contentions, to defuse these issues, not only by
taking attention away from them, but by intermixing the personal traits of
the candidates with them along the issue-image interface. Thus, a complex
issue-image interface became the context for the major event of the 1980
campaign—the Reagan-Carter tlebate.
The Carter-Reagan TV Debate
Having noted the operation of the issue-image interface earlier in the
campaign, we turn to an analysis of the climactic debate in Cleveland on
October 28th, It looked familiar. In the responses to tlie first question (the
one concerning war and peace), for instance, the interchange followed
closely the dynamics of the October 19th speeches—in more than one
instance word for word. The only change worth noting, and it may have
been substantial, was in the further modifieation of Reagan's issue position
to establish more consonance with the "kindly grandfather'element of his
image.
A fresher exchange was generated from William Hilliard's line of (jues-
tioning concerning the plight of the inner cities and the future of an in
terracial society. If we designate this as an issue-oriented contioversy, we
observed Reagan advocating a particularized solution—the development
zone—with the Presidencj as a "bully pulpit" for encouraging racial har
mony.'" No speaker can make substantive contentions widrout introducing
warrants which reflect personality traits. In this case, they almost sugge.st
the traits of a genial bystander,
Carter s responses to the same <juestion, set forth in the language of "we
instituted" and "we plan," implied participation in a tradition of action
and an agent role in the attack on the problem. To some extent this sug
gested character trails which contradicted those which emerged from anal
ysis of the remarks on the foreign policy question. With the aphoristic
''New York Tihu'S, 8 Oct. 1980, p. A27.
" Time (Oct. 20, 1980), p. 6.
® Ibid.
Quotations taken from a tape recording of the debate, October 28, 1980.
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comment that "We are a nation of immigrants," Carter implied a unifying
identity with minorities and refugees.
The responses to this question, as others, were replete with associated
self-references—in this case especially from Reagan, ^ ^en he remarked,
"I have been talking to a number of Congressmen," "I stood in the South
Bronx," "As governor, when I . .. and "I sat with a group of teenagers
who were black," Reagan seemed to be suggesting the traits of one who
seeks and digests information. Carter made fewer self-references in an
swering Hilliard's (luestion and the bulk of his self-references were less
overtlv image-producing than were Reagan's. (It was later in the debate
that he loosed the ultimate line of the "I've been talking to" genre: "I had
a discussion with my daughter, Amy.") These passages illustrate both a
reinforcing and a softening function of self-references in the issue-image
interlace.
Now to turn briefly to an e.xchange in the Cleveland debate which had
a bearing on the issue implications of an image controversy. Barbara Wal
ters' final and most obnoxious ([uestion asked each candidate why people
should not vote for the other candidate—a question which (juite explicitly
called for image controversy. The wording required that they attack one
another's images. Indeed, Carter did refer to Reagan's "belligerent atti
tude" and Reagan called attention to "promises not kept," but essentially
both candidates metamorphized the (luestion into an account of their own
stronger traits. They did this largely by utilizing issues. Carter began with
"war and peace"; Reagan followed with the domestic situation. Carter
ijitroduced the Equal Rights Amendment and Reagan responded. It was
only in the final rejoinders of this interchange that the direct self-refer
ences of "Howard, I'm a Southerner" (Carter) and "I'm the only fellow
who was six times president of his own union" (Reagan) were brought into
play. Even these comments tended to reinforce issues which the candi
dates believed to be important.
In this debate, as in earlier campaign discourse, there was an interlock
ing of issue and image elements, serving both to reinforce and to contradict
one another and establishing themselves through implied warrants as well
as through directly associated self-references.
Evidence. Issues and Image:
The Reagan-Anderson TV Debate
Although this essay has been primarily concerned with the image-issue
interface as illustrated by Reagan and Carter, the Reagan-Anderson debate
in September merits examination as an instance of how the data (as well
as the warrant) of an argument affect issues ami images. The use of doc
umented evidence to support one's position, of course, would appear to
be the essence of issue debating. But it also has important implications for
a candidate's image. Anderson, for example, conspicuously made citations
to reports and studies: "When you have a report, as we did recently . ..
*T have seen figures to indicate . .. "Recently I saw a Princeton Uni
versity study . .. and "the Harvard Business School study indicated
,.. In using such evidence Anderson managed to support his argu
ments and to establish himself as a student as well—with the additional
New York Times, 23 Sept. 1980, pp. BIO and Bll.
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implication that his opponent based his arguments on less sound docu
mentation or none at all.
That there are some dangers for one's image in utilizing such reports
emerged Ifom the colorfiil repartee which resulted when Anderson con
tended that the "Senate Budget Committee report does not accommodate
all of the Reagan defense plans," and Reagan dismissed the contention
with the quip that "some people look up figures and some people make
up figures. The context of tlie exchange was manifestly one of image as
much as issue, as was suggested by the incorporation in the .same passage
by Reagan of the assertion that John has "never held an executive position
of that kind and I think being Governor of California i.s probably the
clo.se.st thing to the Presidency . .. of any executive job in America today."'-
Evidential support, nonnally'a.ssociated with issue controversy, without
doubt intrudes upon image formation as well.
The Interface
In sum, the issue-image interface—a locale for all appeals partaking of
both elements—appears to constitute a fertile ground for exploration of
political discourse, especialb televised political debates in which candi
dates project their images and issues on the same screen at the same time.
While we have not here attempted to define discrete synthetic rhetorical
units, we have indicated some of the ways in which issues and images are
mutually dependent and have set forth some of the implications which
these have suggested.
In the 1980 presidential debate.s—and, indeed, in the entire campaign—
Carter, Reagan and Anderson all appeared to have certain difficulties in
managing their discourse to accommodate both issues and images. This
was a campaign in which direct appeals to the electorate evidently made
a difference, where attitudes and votes were indeed changed. The dialec
tical tensions widiin the issue-image interface were perhaps signs (and
possibly even causes) of the difficult and perplexing time die voter was
having in the stniggle toward an appropriate decision.
Ibid.
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you CANNOT NOT DEBATE;
THE DEBATE OVER THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES
Rodekt L. Scott
Several \ ears ago I complained about what has become an aphorism for
many in the field of communication: you cannot not communicate.' The
common use of that catch phrase struck me then and still strikes me as a
poor interpretation oi Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson,^ and as highly
deleterious to a serious study of the phenomena of communication.
My claim was, and is, that when one is in a communicative situation,
that is, one in which tv,'0 or more persons recognize one another as persons,
then one cannot not communicate; but we are often alone and often with
people in such circumstances that others-a.s-persons are not focid (but, of
course, may become focal). Cietirly, liowever, presidential campaigns are
communicative situations—communicative situations of a rather special
sort in which a candidate not only cannot not communicate, but cannot not
debate. The purpose of this essay is l)oth to develop this argument and to
reveal that the debate about the 1980 presidential debates played a crucial
and formative n)le in the perceptions of the Reagan-Carter televised de
bate of October 28, 1980.
Campaigning, not only but especially presidential campaigning, is such
a situation that those running tor office cannot not debate. If the situation
determines the consequences, then we should be able to see those con
sequences in the residue of any past campaign for public office. If we
studied enough campaigning through time, we might be put in the position
of concluding (1) that my assertion is wrong, (2) that my assertion is con'ect
for campaigning after a certain time but not before, or tliat (3) the residue
from some campaigns do not permit adecjiiate reconstruction.
Now. Imwever, I am interested solely in the 1980 presidential campaign,
and primariK' in the debate about the debates. Even if the Reagan-Ander
son encounter had not been televised, nor the Carter-Reagan affair, there
would have been a debate. Rather, there would have been many debates
that we would finally come to see as one thing.
If we were able now to complete my imagined project of a comparative
studv of all campaigning, or more nearly practical, all presidential cam
paigning, 1 would predict that we could conclude that all important public
communication is mediated. "The message is always an amalgam of phe
nomena and the relationships that give us the sense of unity. Even in
limited circumstances, "a message" is embedded in mediational processes.
In the 1980 presidential campaign the instruments of mediation were with
out doubt myriad, but the role of the electronic mass media was paramount,
and it is on that role that I shall concentrate.
Robert L. Scott is Professor of Spcech-Comnuinication and Chairperson of the
Department of Speech-Communication at the University of Minnesota.
' "Communication as an Intentional, Social System," Huiiidtr Communication
Research. 3 (1977), 258-68.
Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, The Pragmatics
of Human Conununication (New York; W. W. Norton, 1967), p. 49.
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Although the "great debates" of 1960, 1976, and 1980 were broadcast on
radio, it was television that gave them their flavor. Richard Nixon's five
o clock -shadow became not only the fatal flaw for the commentators oij the
fir.st of these twentieth centur>' marvels, taking on epic proportions like
Rnstrum s swor<l breaking, but became a model; we have learned to expect
that .something seen will reveal which of the contestants has the mettle to
win.
With debating carried into the 1980 campaign as a .set of expectations
from the past, makers of media events saw their business as usual in pre
senting what the public demanded. The circularity of reporting news and
making news has been often commented on. This ease is no different, but
it may be sensible here to emphasize the propensity of tlie multitudinous
press, especially the electronic medium, to cast their hiture roles while
playing their present parts: reporting whether or not and if so under what
conditions the candidates would debate.
rhe nominating conventions were scarcely over before the speculating
began: who would have what sort of advantage under what sort of circum
stances? The expectations of potential voters were whetted by the attrib
uting of virtues and vices as verbal combatants to the nominees, and, of
course, the challenge to make face-to-face confrontations involve more
than two faces issued immediately.
Like the public at large, the various reporters played hunches, although
they scarcely labeled their inclinations hunches, and looked for oppor
tunities to confinn them. To have the candidates debate, especiall.v in
circumstances in which the press would play an active role as questioners,
would provide an opportunity to confirm hunches. Dramatized as they now
are in media events, campaigns seem to be alive, activelv seeking foci.
The debate about the debate in 1980 began early and 'lasted late. Soon
the controversy seemed to fizzle, but it took on renewed life us the com
mentators pumped the polls not simply seeking information about how
voters were feeling but constantly interpreting each in such ways as to
create responses. In a stricter sense of "feedback" than we generally see
in textbook discussions of the communicative process, the products (out
puts) were fed back into the process as instructions (inputs) to enhance
further production.
The debate between Carter and Reagan that finally resulted was deter
mined in content and tone by the debate about the debate, The earlier
debate between Reagan and Anderson was, too, but less decisively so.
Fundamentally, the debute about the debate turned on the value oi fair
ness. The primary issue was: What will be fair? One answer was that all
the major contestants would appear together—idl, face-to-fuce. The other
answer was that there should be a round-robin, a series of debates.
Some obser\'ers and some partisans claimed that Reagan simply did not
want to debate and tliat the squabble about including Anderson just gave
him a chance to duck Carter. The supposed advantage of the incumbency
and Carter s prowess as a debater were repeated themes. Time magazine,
in one of its weekly summaries of tlie campaign, quoted a "Ronald Reagan
strategist" as sayiiig, "Facts, numbers and the precision of his engineering
mind will make Carter a formidable opponent. Carter is a master of detail.
He is going to be very, very tough."^' Underlying the Time treahnent is
the implication that to be fair one cannot duck a difficult encounter.
' Time (Sept. 8. 1980), p. 17.
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But another theme was incipient at the beginning, subordinate to fair
ness: it is cowardly not to contest the issues with one's opponent face-to-
face. Both fairness and courage became sharp points that wounded Carter
deeply.
The positions were played out again and again, but each time the tjues-
tion beneath the arguments was taimess. Reagan, early on, took the posi
tion that Anderson ought to appear. His reason was not that Carter was
reputed to be a strong debater against whom he needed help nor the
distraction that a three-cornered affair might provide to offset his possible
gaffes. His reason was that such a debate would be fair. Let all come face-
to-face, at one time, in one place. What could be fairer? Of course he did
not claim that Barry Commoner or Ed Clark should join the debate, and
he did not need to in order to be consistent. The League of Women Voters
shouldered the burden of drawing a line that seemed to include Anderson
and exclude the others.
Ciirter, early on, took the position that any debate involving more than
one of the challengers to the incumbent president would be unfair since
each of the others would be contesting for the position he held, therefore,
two-against-one and that would not be fair.
Later he began to sound shrill as he objected to the legitimacy of An
derson's claim to be included: "I think Anderson is primarih- a creation
of the press. He's never won a primarv', even in his home state. He ran as
a Republican, and he's still a Republican. He hasn't had a convention. He
doesn't have a party. He and his wife picked his vice presidential nomi-
nee.
This comment became the occasion for one of the sharper displays of
disgust at Carter in Tom Wicker's Neiv York Time.v column (titled "Car
ter's Empt>- Chair") in which Wicker called Carter "the first media pres-
ident."-"^ At nearly every turn, the President's attempt to justif>' not debating
Anderson was pictured by the media as making claims to which he had no
fair access.
At the debate between Anderson and Reagan it appeared for awhile as
if an empt>' chair would actually be placed in view of the cameras. That
the chair was not there during that hour scarcely prevented its becoming
symbolic. The well publicized threat was avidly exploited. Cartoonist
Oliphant's version featuring an etnpt>- high chair, with the little man in
the comer saying, "He wants to be above it all," stressed the petulance
widely attributed to Carter. The president was met at a campaign stop in
Springfield, Illinois, with a sign lettered "Carter Is a Chicken." In short,
the taunts were those of the playground, where being fair and displaying
courage often are given negative expression in jeering at die child who
seems unwilling to play unless he can specify the rules.
When debating itself is problematic, the fundamental issue may neces
sarily pivot on the concept of "fairness"; and that concept is probably
always open to interiiretation. The longer the candidates pursue the ques
tions of whether or not to debate, when to debate, and how to tlebate, the
more crucial the underlying value of fairness is likely to become.
Reagan's position on the debate about the debate was probably more
easily understood than Carter's. Even more important, Carter seemed to
be avoiding or seeking advantage to a much greater degree than did Rea
gan. Especially after Reagan and Anderson debated, Reagan's apparent
concern for fairness eclipsed Carter's.
^ Time (Sept. 22, 1980), p. 8.
^New York Times, 12 Sept, 1980, p. A23.
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Ml of the.se reinforcements became critical in the debate between Carter
and Reagan. Not that the effect of polling needed emphasizing, but the
apparent role that the change.s in the margins on the various polls had in
the hnal disposition to arrange a debate underscored not onlv the critical-
ness of the polls themselves but of Carter's seeking of an advantage. In
the debate, Reagan s demeanor—his smile, cocking of his head and re
peated "There you go again . . ."—served to cast Carter in the roie of one
who takes advantage. The dynamic of the debate about the debate served
to insert the concept ol fairness, i.e., one who takes unfair advantage
1 woukl argue, then, that Carter lost the election, as he himself later
speculated, in the debate but that the impetus that made the contrast be
tween himself and Reagan so dramatic was largelv fixed in the debate
about the debate."
Closely woven into the fabric of the debate about the debate were per
ceptions of the characters of the principal actors: Carter and Reagan. Per
haps a perception of the character of the participants, or potential partic-
ipants if we remain looking at the events preceding the final confrontation,
will always be an important aspect of judging a debate.
In the 1980 campaign, the Carter strategy, clearly, was to tr>' to contrast
his pnibitv vyith Reagan's insecure grasp both of relevant data and in
terpretive abilit)-. The model, especialh' as the media dramatized it, was
the way the incumbent President John.son had characterized his opponent
as Quick Draw Goldwater. .As the nominating convention closed, Carter's
pollster, Put Caddell, found the bright side to Reagan's apparent lead; in
fact, Caddell asserted that it would have been nice had Reagan's margin
been even larger to emphasize Carter as the underdog and to make Rea-
gan s suitability the easy target of the appeal to the voters' discrimination:
' One thing I am much surprised by is the enormous doubt about Ronald
Reagan." '
Unfortunately for Carter, the model and hence the strateg>' was all too
apparent. Constantly the media picttired him, and his campaigners, as neg
ative. The image ol a negative President looking for, waiting impatienth^
for, preparing avidly for his opponent to look bad became difficult for
Carter to deal with. Since in the minds of manv, Carter was error prone
the irony was scarcely to be missed. In spite of Caddell's being pleased
by the distrust of Reagan, .some polls seemed to indicate that a strong anti-
Carter sentiment was a more important constituent of the support for
Reagan than was the anti-Reagan feeling in turning voters to Carter."
When the debate finally anived, pictured as it was as Carter's chance to
capitalize on what the poll watchers dramatized as a shift away from Rea
gan, the President was left in an unenviable predicament: how to sling
mud without being perceived as a mud-slinger. Undoubtedly neither the
President nor his advisers would have put the matter in thos'e words, but
' Carter was not alone, of course, in fretting about the impact of the debate. Just
two days before the election Fat Catldell telephoned reporter Elizabeth Drew to
convey his erroneous belief tliat Carter hati turned the election aromid; "We were
getting killed on Thursday ami Friday [after the debate). Now a whole new election
is Liking place. Caddell went on t») explain that the results of a new poll would be
in later that day, which he hoped would confinn the trend, but "I just wi.sh we
hadn't debated," See Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large—1980: The Election "
The .Vetf Vorker (Dec. 1, 1980). pp. 182-83.
'Time (Aug. 2.5, 1980), p. 11.
" See, e.g., Time (Sept. 15, 1980), p. 12.
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again the dynamics of the debate about the debate had honed the poten
tialities and presented the accoutrements of the role as fitting.
The result was from the outset strange—even absurd. Carter, who had
been touted all along as a powerful debater, quick with the facts held in
astounding detail, ready to dazzle listeners and confuse an opponent, was
stiff and ill at ease. His characteristic slowly paced speech seemed stiff
and uncertain, rather than cool and concerned. Reagan, on the other hand,
seemed to come determined not to debate at all, as he ignored the thrust
of questions and concentrated on appearing calm and unflappable in the
face of the renowned debater who was to be treated as detennined to make
painful, personal attacks. Whether or not Reagan's strategy was purposive,
that demeanor was a neat foil to the Carter camp's insistence that any
debate be held long enough before the election to correct misstatements
or misrepresentations.® In short, it was simple enough to perceive Reagan
as long-suffering: denied an early confrontation with Carter through his
insistence on being fair to John Anderson and finally granted a face-to-face
encounter only when and under conditions that seemed on the surface to
favor Mr. Carter.
Although many academic commentators shrink from calling these aftairs
genuine debates, the quality of a verbal contest was tliere. The value of
fairness, as strange as the guises in which it appeared, colored what po
tential voters saw. Many were apparently prepared to chide Carter for
taking advantage and to siieer at his failure to do so effectively. His man
ifest lack of confidence gave the non-verbal stamp of the look of the loser
that we have been taught to seek out. His attributing the spector of nuclear
holocaust as the most serious issue to remarks of his daughter Amy seemed
more than over reaching—it seemed desperate. What more dramatic con
trast could Reagan's tacticians have asked for as their candidate played his
role as cool, confident, and willing to take the worst from a determined
fault finder?
In pushing hard to put Reagan on the defensive. Carter fulfilled the
prophecy of the press. His efforts looked strategic because they had been
so labeled well in advance for instant identification. Reagan's manner,
much more than his actual replies, stamped him as a well prepared, cool
adversary, perhaps fitting the role repeatedly polished by the commenta
tors waiting for the debate: being presidential. Carter's very presence in
the debate after standing aloof the first time, as well as his hard struggling,
underscored beliefs like Tom Wicker's wicked depiction of his "h^d won
reputation for indecision, ineptitude and speed on the backtrack."'"
Few audiences of political encounters have ever been so well instructed
in how to respond. Professional football playoffs give us the model for
contant analyzing of strengths, weaknesses, and predictions of probable
® A good deal leads me to believe that Reagan's strategv- was (juite purpo.sive.
Myles Martel, in his essay elsewhere in this issue, details Reagan's rehearsal with
Representative David Stockman playing Carter, as he had earlier played Anderson,
familiarizing him.self with the tactics e.spected. Martel claim.s that during that time
Reagan himself came up with "there you go again," the only memorable phrase
from the debate—and one readily understood because we were so thoroughly
schooled to interpret Carter as attacking Reagan's record. The phrase was masterful,
especially delivered as it was by Reagan. A person identified hy Newsweek maga
zine as "one senior Carter strategist" was quite right: "Reagan's awfully good at
putting on that hurt look" (Oct. 27, 1980, p. 37).
^"New York Times, 12 Sept. 1980, p. A^.
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strategies. The showdown between Carter and Reagan only lacked the
incessant running eonnnentar\' to fill out the model.
The debate between Carter and Reagan was a media event. The media,
and especially television, were involve<l in such a way as to appear the
brokers of yet another all encompassing contest. Yet when the debate fi
nally came, it was less a Superbowl than something at least slighth- more
absurd—a familiar cast of characters pitted in conventional conflict but
somehow unfittingly. Perhaps it was the 1980 political equivalent of what
occupied main viewers later in the fall: the Battle of the NFL Cheerlead
ers.
In any case, the final debate must lie seen as the culmination of, the
denouement of the long debate about the debates.
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DEBATE PREPARATIONS IN THE REAGAN CAMP:
AN INSIDER'S VIEW
Myles Martel
Of the hundreds of appearances made by Ronakl Reagan, Jimmy Carter
and John Anderson during the 1980 presidential campaign, none drew
more public attention nor earned more significance than the two presi
dential deijates. The debate between Reagan and Anderson on September
21 and the "Great Debate" between Reagan and Carter on October 28
occurred at critical points in the campaign. The first debate was a valued
opportunity for Anderson to strengthen his candidacy and, ironicalK , for
Reagan to strengthen his campaign as well, for many thought Anderson
could draw more votes from Carter's support base than from Reagan's. The
second <lebate, it was generally believed, could influence enough unde
cided voters to ultimately affect the election.
As a participant in and a witness to the eimrmously complex process of
debate preparations in the Reagan camp, 1 shall highlight the strategy and
tactics and the personalities and feelings behind these two historic events.
Formation of Reagan's Debate Task Force
Reagan's debate task force was formed in mid-August by James Baker,
III, Gerald Ford's campaign manager in 1976 and George Bush's in 1980.
A tough but amiable master organizer with impressive political acumen
and negotiating skill. Baker convinced other senior Reagan advisors ol the
importance of fonning a debate team composed primarily of people not
intimately involved in the day-to-day management of the campaign. In that
way, the task force could devote most of its energ>' to the debates.
Members of the tusk force, in adtlition to me, included Bill Carruthers,
Frank Ursomarso, David Gergen and Frank Hodsoll. Carruthers, a top-
notch Hollywood television producer who had served as Gerald Ford's
media advisor in 1976 and who was serving In a similar capacity for Rea
gan, would take charge of technical preparations and would become one
of Reagan's negotiators with the sponsor of both debates, the League ol
Women Voters. Ursomarso, an accomplished advance man for Ford and
Nixon who had headed the advance operation for the 1976 presidential
debates, would do the same for the 1980 debates. Gergen, a resident fellow
of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and man-
aging editor of Public Opinion, would head up tlie preparation ot Reagan's
briefing materials. He had served as head of the White House Office of
Communications under Ford and is highly regarded as a policy analyst
and speechwriter. Hodsoll, a former State Department official {Deputy
U.S. Representative for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms) and an exeep-
Mylcs Martel was a member of"the Reagan campaign's Debate Task Force in the
1980 presidential campaign. He is a Pvot'essor of Speech Communication at West
Chester State College (Pennsylvania) and has served as a campaign communication
consultant for U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representiitives, and gubernatorial candi
dates, and as a Resource .\dvisor to the Twentieth Century Fund's Task Force on
Televised Presidential Debates. He is now completing Debates in American Politi
cal Campaigns, a definitive study of political debating strategy.
Copyright 1981 by Myles Martel.
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Table 1. Candidates' poll standing.
TABLE 1: CANDIDATES' POLL STANDING
PEAGAN DECIDES
TO DEBATE CARTER .
REAQAN/ANOERSON OCT. 1{
DEBATE SEPT. 21
£ 35
REAGAN
NOMINATED
JULY 16
REAGAN
CARTER/REAGAN
DEBATE
OCT. 28
CARTER
a 30-
CARTER CAMP
SECRETLY DISCUSSES
AVOIDING DEBATE
/'CARTER CARTER REFUSES TO **"00^*^4°*"
/NOMINATED debate ANDERSON
^  AUG 14 REAGAN
SEPT. 9
ANDERSON
ELIGIBLE TO DEBATE
SEPT. 8
ANDERSON
20-
15-
10- UNDECIDED
IS-18 SEPT
12-15
JUNE JULY
27-30 11-14
AUG.
1-4
(BASED ON GALLUP POLL)
OCT. 24-26 NOV. 1
splso
tional ailTiiinistrator with a well-disciplincci legal mind, would manage the
re.searc'h and the administration of tlie debute preparations.
Reagan .s top-echelon advisors would also reinforce considerably the ef
forts of the debate task force. These advisors included; Reagan's closest
aide, Edward Meese; his campaign manager, William Casey; and his poll
ster and premier campaign strategist, Richard Wirthlin (with whom I
woukl work closely).
InitialK", our major responsibilitv' was to preptire for a debate which
might include Reagan, Carter and Anderson, but prospects for such a con
test did not last long. Carter withdrew on September 9, the dav the League
deemed Anderson eligible to debate (Table 1). Clearly, Carter did not
want to elevate Anderson's legitimacy as a candidate, especialls since An
derson threatened to take man\' more votes from him than from Reagan.
Although the public disappro\ ed of Carter's decision bv a 2-1 margin, he
apparently rea.soned that the negative publicity resulting from his refusal
would be easier to shoulder than the risks associated with delxiting.' He
insisted, however, that he would debate Reagan alone for the first debate,
a proposition our camp never seriously contemplated. We wanted to cap
italize on the -Anderson factor and Reagan himself believed that as long as
Anderson was viable, he did not want to be a party to excluding him.
'  Po'li Sept. 21, 1980. For aciditional inforniation on polling data collected by the Reagan and Carter campaigns, see "Face Olh A Conversation with
the Presidents PolLsters Patrick Caddell ami Richard Wirthlin." Public Opinion
Vol. 3. No, 6 (Dec. 1980-Jan. 1981). pp. 2-14,
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Once Carter withdrew, we discussed whether or not Reagan should de
bate Anderson alone. At 4:30 p.m. on the day Anderson became eligible
and Carter withdrew Camithers asked me to transmit to the Reagan Head
quarters within an hour a memo regarding the advisability-- of a Reagan-
Anderson debate. He explained that it would be read at a 0:(K) p.m. meet
ing called to discuss the issue. In my memo I argued that Reagan would
gain little by debating, but that he could lose more b>' refusing, especially
since he had spent the past month championing Anderson's participation
in a three-way debate. I also noted that Reagan could "strike a pleasing
contrast against Anderson who comes off as too intense and even cock
sure."^ The prospect that Reagan might make a galfe during the debate—
a concern which loomed large since he had made several within the past
montli—was a risk I felt we had to assume. Ducking the debate could
perpetuate the "gaffe" image; performing well could stop it dead in its
tracks. Late that night, following an exhaustive discussion of the issue, I
was told that Reagan and Anderson would indeed debate.
With the debate only twelve days away, preparations intensified. The
briefing team, aided by several volunteers from law firms, think tanks, and
congressional staffs, collected, read, dissected and screened literally tens
of thousands of pages on more tlian 100 issues ultimately covered in
Reagan's briefing books. Baker, Camithers, and Dean Burch (former FCC
chairman and Goldwater's campaign manager in 1964) negotiated the for
mat and planned the technical aspects of the debate. Baker sent out re
quests for strategy recommendations to politically astute Republicans and
helped set up the debate practice sessions. Leslie Sorg, fonner Director
of Communications for tlie National Federation of Republican Women,
perfonned liackground research on the panelists suggested by the League
and ultimately selected by them following recommendations from each
candidate's camp.
Goals and Strategy for Baltimore
Reagan's goal for this debate was to perfomi "very respectably"—to
present a "respectable" answer to each question, to remain presidential—
against the man considered to be the House of Representatives' outstand
ing orator. As the strateg>' was developed, we expected Reagan to do well
against Anderson. He had. we agreed, outperformed him during the New
Hampshire and Illinois primary debates.^
Reagan's specific goals were to emphasize Carter s incompetent lead
ership and to project his own "reasonableness, moderation and sensitivi-
* Memorandum, Myles Martel to James Baker, III, Sept. 9, 1980.
®See the Washington Post, 28 Feb. 1980, p. 1. According to Wirthlm's polling
data, reported in this article, Reagan was named winner of the League's February
20. 1980 Manchester, New Hampshire Pre.sidential Primary Forum by 33% of the
voters surveyed. George Bush garnered 17%, John Anderson 14%, and Howard
Baker 12%. Coverage of the League's Midwest Forum, held in Chicago on March
13, 1980, indicates that Anderson had difficulty selling himself as he drew heavy
attacks from Reagan, Bush, and Philip Crane. See the New York Times, 14 March
1980, p. 16, and the Philadelphia Bulletin, 14 March 1980, p. B4. Reagan, upon
hearing Anderson state in the Illinois forum that he would not automatically support
the Republican Party's nominee, took command of the opportunit> by dramatically
turning to Anderson to ask: "John, you wouldn't really find Teddy Kennedy pref
erable to me, would you?"
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ty," especially since a significant portion of the electorate believed he
possessed the opposite traits. Towartl this etui our greatest hope strategi
cally was for Anderson to attack Carter harder than Reagan. Such a scenario
would allow Reagan to minimize defending his own positions, to pay less
attention to Anderson s, and to focus on the salient negative aspects of
Carter s record. In fact, several conversations with Reagan were aimed at
developing a "pass through" strategy which would have him talking
"through" Anderson to take on Carter's record.
Our concent regarding Andersoti's inteiKled strateg>' was heightened
when a Wdshin^tou Po.st ixrtjcle which appeared tlie week before the debate
quoted Anderson as intending to focus the debate on Reagan to difteren-
tiate himself as much as possible from him. "If I attack Carter," Anderson
reasoned, "I begin to look like a pale image of Ronald Reagan, and I'm not
that, I in not that. * Whether or not Antlerson was merely posturing is
unclear, for his anti-Reagan attacks were no more severe than those lev
elled at Carter.
Two related strategic issues also surfaced before the Baltimore debate.
First, to what e.xtent shoukl Reagan stress Carter's absence? Second, how
forceful should Reagan s anti-Carter attacks be? Our concern for a possible
voter backlash prompted us to counsel Reagan not to overplay Carter's
absence and to temper his anti-Carter attacks. The risk of overplaying
Carter's absence was. however, effectively reduced when the League, ap
parently succumbing to Democratic pressure, reneged on its commitment
to our and Anderson's negotiators to place a lectern in the center of the
stage to symbolize Carter's absence.
Preparations for Baltimore
Our first meeting with Reagan was held on September 15 at Wexford,
the sprawling and secluded Virginia estate he rcntecl after his nomination.
Led by Baker, the meeting familiarized Reagan with the planning behind
the debate, including the recommended strategv' (which I presented) and
allowed Gergcn and Hodsoll to e.xplain the first set of briefing materials,
a notebook of approximateh' 70 pages. When the meeting entled the task
force members appeared confident that Reagan appreciated the importance
of the debate and was willing to sacrifice three full days of campaigning
to prepare for it.
On September 18, we began three days of intensive meetings with Rea
gan at liis home. Originally, fonnal briefings were planned for each morn
ing and practice (luestion and answer sessions for the aftenioons. However,
we soon discovered tliat Reagan felt more comfortaijle ami derived greater
stimulation from the (piestion and answer sessions crituiued by his advi
sors. As a result, we spent the afternoon of the first da\ and the entire
preparation time of the next two days in his garage, a building Carruthers
had converted into a professional qualitv- television studio. The studio, a
20' by 30' carix'ted room which would also be used for the Cleveland
debate, was replete with 18 theatrical lights, 2 television cameras, 2 mon
itors, a lectern replicating the one to be used in Baltimore, two professional
cameramen and a lighting expert.
The initial sessions involved questions posed to Reagan by major ad
visors and ke\- aides acting as panelists. Participating in at least one session
for either debate were economic and domestic policy advisors Martin An-
* W«s/«ngton Past, 19 Sept. 1980, p. 9.
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derson, Alan Greenspan, William Simon and Caspar Weinberger; foreign
policy and militaiy advisors Richard Allen, William Van Cleve and Stefan
Halper; Senators Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) and John Tower (R., Tex.);
Representatives Margaret Heckler (R., Mass.) and Richartl Cheney (R.,
Wyo.) and Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leavy University Professor of Comparative
Politics at Georgetown University and resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Following each question
or round of tjucstions, Reagan's responses were critiqued b> panelists and
other advisors, including myself, for accuracy, completeness, strategic and
tactical soundness, and persuasiveness.
On September 19, two days before the Baltimore debate, John Ander
son's stand-in arrived on the .scene. David Stockman, a bright, gentleman
ly, and articulate two-tenn Congressman from Michigan who had once
sei-ved as John .Anderson's administrative assistant, impressed all of us
with a realistic portrayal of his former boss. The air of competition imposed
by Stockman's role helped make Reagan's answers more pointed and his
style more self-assured.
The Baltimore Format
In our judgment, the Baltimore f ormat may have slightly favored Reagan
(Table 2). We were especially pleased that our negotiators had secured a
60 rather than a 90 minute debate. The additional 30 minutes would have
given Anderson more exposure, and would have increased the chances
that our candidate might make a mistake or be caught iminfonned on a
relatively obscure issue. The provision for only six (luestions with only
three being asked first of Reagan also reduced these risks. Furthermore,
since each candidate received the same question, no question could be
easily slanted for or against one candidate. Finally, repetition of the ques
tion by the panelists, an innovation, reduced the possibility of embarassing
misinterpretation.
The "John" Tactic
One of the tactical highlights of the Baltimore debate was Reagan's ref
erence to Anderson as "John." Although Reagan was counselled to do this
after he briefl\' considered calling him "Congressman Anderson," he prob
ably would have referred to him as "John" if no such advice were given.
Reagan had, after all, called Anderson "John" during the Illinois primary
debate. The effectiveness of the "John" tactic was attributable in large
measure to Anderson's tendency to refer to Reagan as "Sir," "Governor
Reagan" and "my opponent." Indeed, Reagan's calm, avuncular manner
contrasted pleasingly with Anderson's more intense st>le.
A Little Noticed Foul in Baltimore
Whether or not debaters should take notes to their lectenis is often a
thorny issue. While they might ordinarily prefer access to them, they also
fear that using notes might project them as uninformed or tliat their op
ponent might use dramatically a damaging letter, newspaper article or other
document. The use of notes, liowever, was not at issue during negotiations
for either 1980 presidential debate. Emulating the agreement reached be
fore the 1976 presidential debates, Reagan's, Anderson's, and Carter's ne
gotiators readily agreed that no notes would be taken to the lectem, al
though candidates would be permitted to make notes during the debate.
Despite this agreement, Anderson took to his podium at least three file
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Table 2. Reagan vs. Anderson, Baltimore Debate, Septemlrer 21, 1980.
Each of the candidates was required to respond to the same question. A question
round wa.s formatted as follow,s:
Question #1: 30 seconds
Candidate A response; 2:30
Question #1 re.stated to candidate B: 30 seconds
Candidate B response: 2:30
Candidate A rejoinder: 1:15
Candidate B rejoinder: 1:15
The hour-length fonnat allowed for six individual (luestions, i.e. each panel member
asked only one question of the candidates.
There were no opening statements, with closing statements limited to three minutes
per candidate.
folders which he frequenth consulted off-camera while Reagan was speak
ing. In fact, he actually road most of his closing address. To compound
matters, moderator Bill Movers made no mention of the "no notes" pro
vision in his opening remarks (despite our elfort.s for him to do so) and tlid
not reprimand Aixierson for using tliem.
To prevent this prolilem in Cleveland, our negotiators arranged for Rea
gan's and Carter's note pads to be color coded and for moderator Howard
K. Smith to mention the "no notes" provision in hi.s opening remarks.
What the Baltimore Debate Did for Reagan
For five principal reasons the Baitiinore debate was a positive event for
the Reagan campaign. Specifically, it; (1) projected Reagan as Presiden
tial—as a reasonable, fiiir, intelligent human being; (2) conveyed the
impression that his issue positions were responsible (as opposed to radi
cal); (3) placed tlie "gaffe" image at a reasonably comfortahle distance
behind him; (4) reinforced Anderson's candidacy at least to a modest ex
tent; and (.5) p()rtra\ed Jiimn\- Carter negativch- for refusing to debate.®
Hopes for a Reagan-Carter Debate Fall and Rise
For approximately tiiree weeks following the Baltimore debate the like
lihood of a Reagan-Carter debate diminished. This expectation was rein
forced by our hope that Reagan would not ha\'e to debate Carter. While
we had confidence in Reagan's del)ating skills, nurtured largely by his
successful performance in six del>ates throughout the canipaign and
!)> his more telegenic image, we nevertheless regarded Carter as for
midable. He had four years of on-the-job experience, a penchant for using
specifics impressively and the abilit> to project a blend of earnestness,
sincerity and piety which could compete with Reagan's more casual but
nonetheless engaging manner.
B>' mid October the prospect of a Reagan-Carter debate resurfaced as
John Anderson's eligibility to participate in any League-sponsoretl debate
(two-way or three-wuy) diminished. And as this debate was being contem
plated, we soon discovered within our camp a considerable difference of
opinion over accepting it. Some thought that Carter was closing in on
Reagan and considered the debate essential to reverse the momentuin.
® Memoraiuluni, Myles Martel to James Baker. Ill, Sept. 30. 1980
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Others, relying on Wirthlin's polls, believed Reagan held a comfortable
lead and should therefore avoid the risk of another debate. Ultimately, it
was decided that Reagan could not afford to refuse. Refusing would give
Carter a strongly marketiible issue with less than three weeks to election
day.
Little did we know in mid October as we contemplated a second pres
idential debate that Carter's top political strategists were planning to avoid
it—II position supported b\' both his wile, Rosalynn, and by his pollster,
Pat Caddell. At tliat point Reagan was trailing Carter slightly in most polls
and was losing momentum as Carter was gaining it. Their plan involved
presenting Reagan with an ultimatum that they felt he had to refuse: de
bate Carter by the end of that week or there wouhl be no debate." Clearly,
Carter wanted to minimize Reagan's opportunity to prepare. This scheme
was, however, preempted by the League which suddenly abandoned the
condition that Anderson be included in a three-way debate. The League
plan, unlike Carter's, would give Reagan at least ten days of preparation
time.
Once Reagan decided to debate Carter, Baker again set in motion the
process which preceded the Baltimore debate. Gergen's and Hodsoll's
briefing team spent approximately 12 consecutive 12-hour to 18-hour days
refining materials prejiared for the Baltimore debate, adding sections on
foreign policy, a topic not debated in Baltimore. Gergen assembled the
expert panelists for the practice debates, prepared numerous position
statements and solicited strategy memoranda. Baker, Camithers and Burch
hammered out a complex format with Carter's representatives (Robert
Strauss. Jody Powell and Jerry Rafshoon) and attended to numerous other
logistical details. Sorg resumed the background research on the panelists.
Ursomarso and his staff once again meticulously orchestrated tlie advance
operation.
Wirthlin, his assistant Richard Beal, and I prepared a series of strategy
and tactics memoranda. These memos were based upon: (I) Wirthlin's
campaign plan; (2) polling information; and (3) my analysis of Carter's and
Reagan's debating styles. My analysis focused upon the "response behav
ior" of the t\N'o candidates in various question-and-answer forums. In Car
ter's case, I examined the 1976 presidential debates between Carter and
Ford, as well as recent press conferences and "Town Meetings." In
Reagan's, I studied the various presidential primary forums, plus the more
recent debate with Anderson.
Goals and Strategy for Cleveland
Reagan's broad goal for the Cleveland debate was again to perfonn very
respectably. The main strategy is captured in the opening paragraph of his
strategy memorandum.
If the Governor succeeds Tuesday in making Jimmy Carter's record the
major issue of the debate and the campaign, we will succeed in the debate
and win the general election.
If, however, Carter muke.s Ronald Reagan the issue of the debate and the
campaign, we will lo.se both."
"New York Times, 9 November 1980, p. I.
^ Memorandum, Richard Wirthlin, Richard Beal and Myles Martel to Governor
Reagan, October 21, 1980.
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Reagan's target audience for this debate was Republicans and ticket
splitters. Specifically, he needed to increase their turnout on election day
for, according to Wirthlin s polling infonnation, if the turnout of Reagan's
supporters would exceed Carter's by 2%, Reagan's Electoral College mar
gin would increase b\' 30 votes.
As the debate approached, we questioned ijicreasingly how Reagan
should relate to the unpredictable, constantl\ changing circumstances sur
rounding the possible release by election da\' (or even b\" the day of the
debate) of the 52 American hostages held by the Iranian militants, to what
extent, if any, was Carter using this situation as a foil against the debate
and Reagan's campaign in general? And to what extent, if any, should
Reagan comment on the situation iiefore, during or after tlie debate? As
we contemplated these issues there was some feeling in our camp that
Carter might excuse himself from the debate and fly to Gennany to greet
the freed hostages or use the debate to make a disanning announcement
regarding them.
No less onerous was the dilemma we faced in attempting to counter
Carters apparent success in recent weeks in portraying Reagan as dan
gerous—as far too inclined to use militar\' force before exhausting diplo
matic initiatives. Dozens of meetings and general conversations focused
on whether or not Reagan should explicitly attack Carter for exploiting this
fear tactic? Or would such ati approach project undue defensiveness or
result in effective counterargument by Carter?
While we never agreed on whether or not Reagan should attack Carter
pointedly during the debate for his "mad bomber" charges, Reagan felt,
and no one within the inner circle disagreed, that he could defuse his
"dangerous" image by remaining presidential. This could be accom
plished by his projecting an overall gooil-natured approach to the debate,
b\ focusing as much as possible on Carter's domestic failures rather than
on defense and foreign policy issues, and by allowing Carter to establish
the attack tone of the debate. In this latter regard Reagan was advised not
to suiqxiss, but to respond in kind, to the tone and amount of attack levelled
by Carter. Attacking too hard, we felt, could result in voter backlash and
reinforce the "mad bomber" perception.
Contrarx- to our strategy, however, several of the memoranda received
from prominent Republicans advocated a "no holds barred" attack on Car
ter s record, anticipating that Carter would direct such an attack against
Reagan—which, in fact, he did not do in the debate. No one on the debate
task force (myself inclmied) expected Carter to direct such an assault. We
believed he would attempt, instead, to soften his recently publicized rep
utation for "meanness."
Preparations for Cleveland
The task force's first meeting with Reagan in preparation for Cleveland
was held on October 25. four days before the debate. I began the session
by presenting him with a video-taped debate profile of Jimm\- Carter based
principally on excerpts drawn from the 1976 presidential debates. This
program was intended to be educational and motivational. Educationally,
it conveyed to Reagan (and to Congressman Stockman, now the Carter
stand-in) what 1 perceived as Carter's meanness toward Ford, his evasive
ness, proneness to attack, and penchant for specifics. Motivationally, it was
intended to instill a fighting spirit in the Governor, who is not naturally
combative. In fact, his good-naturedness probably accounted for his tread
ing at lease somewhat too lightly on Carter's record during the Baltimore
debate.
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Shortly after this presentation, Wirthlin, Baker and I briefed the Gov
ernor on strateg>' and tactics. The seven points stressed most were:
1. Keep the debate focused as much as possible on Carter's record. Meet
offensive with offensive, Don't feel obligated to defend particulars
of your positions.
2. Show righteous indignation in resp«)nding to:
a. Carter's attacks or inniiendos that you are dangerous.
b. Attacks directed at your California credentials.
Looking directly at Carter in such instances may be very effective.
3. Humor or a confident smile can also disarm Carter when he thinks he's
got you where he wants you.
4. When Carter is speaking—especially when he is attacking you-look at
him or take notes.
5. Wherever possible, weave your major theme into your responses: "Jim
my Carter has had his chance and has blown it (relate to examples
that fit question); you offer promise—hope."
6. Conclude your re.sponses with an attack line against Carter or a people-
oriented line based on your proposals.
7. Show compassion hy tlrawing from experiences on the campaign
trail .. ..»
The remaining two and a half days before the Cleveland debate were
principally devoted to practice sessions. Carruthers served as moderator
while Reagan's major economic, domestic and foreign policy advisors (in-
cliicling several from outside the campaign stafi) plaN ed the role of panel
ists. The day before the Reagan-Carter debate, I also served as a panelist
along with Martin Anderson and Ha>-den Biy an. Anderson was Reagan's
chief domestic advisor in the campaign, while Bryan (who took a vacation
leave to work on the debate preparations) was a policy analyst for the
Labor and Human Resources Committee of the U.S. Senate. Baker chaired
tl^e critique sessions which generally followed each round of questions.
As was the case leading up to the Baltimore debate. Reagan was at his
best when Stockman (Carter's stand-in) was doggedly on the attack. Par
ticularly during the Sunda>- practice session. Stockman's taunting could
not throw Reagan off balance. Reagan displayed impressive equanimitv-,
increasing responsiveness, and a greater willingness to attack Carter's re
cord. Moreover, there were no gaffes during this or any other session; in
short, Reagan appeared ready for Carter.
On Monday, October 27, the morning before the debate, the atmosphere
became tense. Not only were the stakes of the tlebate more pronounced
than ever, l)ut Reagan was having difficult\- hitting his stride. The uncer
tain Iranian hostage crisis was apparently wearing on him. And compound
ing these pressures was the burden of reviewing refined position state
ments on Iran and Salt II, which had been prepared throughout the day
by his major advisors.
Following a lengthy lunch the same day with former President Ford,
Reagan returned to the studio for the last practice session before Cleve
land. It, too, was lackluster, leaving the team with an uneasy feeling about
how he would perfonn in Cleveland. Reagan, however, appeared less wor
ried, remarking in typical good humor that a perfect dress rehearsal was
always the best way to ruin the opening night.
" Memorandum, James Baker, III and Myles Martel to Governor Reagan, October
24, 1980.
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Table 3. Reagan vs. Carter, Cleveland Debate, October 28, 1980.
Format I
Format II
Closing Statements
Four first-round questions;
Question to Candidate A: :30
Candidate A response: 2:00
Follow-up question: :30
Candidate A response 1:00
Same question to Candidate B: ;30
Candidate B response: 2:00
Follow-up question: :3()
Candidate B response: 1:00
Candidate A rebuttal: 1:00
Candidate B rebuttal: 1:00
TOTAL 10:00
(4 X ]0 minutes = 40 minutes)
Four second-round questions:
Question to candidate A:
Candidate A response:
Same (|uestion to Candidate B:
Candidate B resjxmse:
Candidate A rebuttal:
Candidate B rebuttal:
Candidate A surrebuttal:
Candidate B surrebuttal:
TOTAL
(4 X 10 minutes =» 40 minutes)
Candidate A:
Candidate B:
Moderator close:
:30
2:00
:30
2:00
1:30
I;30
1:00
1:00
10:00
3 minutes
3 minutes
30 seconds
The Cleveland Format
The format for the Cleveland debate is probably the most complex one
ever devised. In fact, what more than 100 million viewers saw were two
back-to-back, 40-minute deljatcs (Table 3). The fonnat was fiiir to Reagan
and, in all likelihood, did not tiivorone candidate over the other. We were
not enamored with the follow-up question feature incorporated into For
mat I, because follow-ups tend to favor the more informed incumbent. On
the other hand, we were pleased with the cpiestion repetition feature. We
were also comfortable with the response times in Formats I and II being
confined to two minutes. In our view the longer the response segment, the
greater the incumbent's advantage and the greater the potential for mis-
statements.
The most interesting development of the entire format negotiation pro
cess occurred the morning before the del)ate when Baker received a call
from Strauss requesting that Reagan take the first question and close last.
Up to that point Carter, l)\ virtue of having won a coin toss, had elected
the first question/last close option. As we discussed this issue with Reagan
in the comfort of his living room, we were uncertain about Strauss' motives,
although we felt he probably wanted Reagan to "take the heat" first, tliere-
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by giving Carter a greater opportuiut>' to reflect, focus, and set the tone of
his attack. With an air of tentativeness more pronounced than at any other
point leading up to either debate, most of us counselled Reagan to gamble
and seize upon the opportunity presented by Strauss' request. We felt that
Reagan's opportunity to give the last closing address could preclude sur
prises created if Carter had the last close and give Reagan psychological
control over the end of the debate. Reagan decided to take the gamble.
Strauss' plo\ backfired. While Reagan got off to a hesitant start in fielding
the first question (something we thought might happen because he had a
similar problem in Baltimore), he improved rapidly and soon displayed
considerable confidence.
"There You Go Again"
and
Reagan's Five Compeliing Questions
If any Reagan tactic during the Cleveland debate qualifies as a master
stroke, it was his use of the line, "There you go again," when responding
to a potentialK' damaging attack by Carter. Reagan had been advised dur
ing the strateg)' sessions and the videotape analysis of Carter s debate style
to use lines which could dramatically differentiate himself from Carter,
especially since this was one of Carter's own pronounced tactics against
Ford during the 1976 debates. "There you go again," crafted by Reagan
himself and practiced on Stockman two days earlier, successfully elevated
Reagan without projecting him as unduly strident or defensive—indeed a
formidable challenge when refuting an incumbent President.
Possibly appro.ximating the impact of "There you go again" (if not sur
passing it) were the five rhetorical questions Reagan used in his closing
address. These, Reagan believed, captured the essence of his aiulience's
attitudes about their lives during Carter's four years as President and gave
him the psychological control over the close of the debate that he sought
when he accepted Strauss' request that he open first and close last.
Next Tuesday, all of you will go to the polls, and stand there in the
polling place and make a decision. I think when you make that decision it
might be well if you ask yourself, are you better off than you were four
years ago? Is it easier for you to go and buy things in the stores than it was
four years ago? Is there more or less unemployment in the country than
there was four years ago? Is America as respected throughout the world as
it was? Do you feel that our security is as safe, that we're as strong as we
were four years ago?®
Post-Debate Influence
A prevailing perception as we prepared for both debates was that the
media's reaction to them would be as important, if not more so, than the
viewer's immediate reactions. This perception was reinforced by research
conducted after the second presidential debate in 1976 wherein President
Ford committed his infamous gaffe concerning Easteni Eimope. The re
search revealed that immediately following the debate Ford was perceived
as the winner, but due to the media's play of the gaffe. Carter soon sur-
pa.ssed him.'"
® These line.s arc largely similar to those contained in a draft of the closing address
prepared by David Gergen.
See Frederick T. Steeper, "Public Response to Gerald Ford's Statements on
Eastern Europe in the Second Debate," in The Preskleritial Debates; Media, Elec-
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The campaign's concern for potential media influence of the debate re
sults prompted the organization of an extensive surrogate eflort. Led by
veteran political consultant Clifford White, it involved making available
to the media major credible Reagan advocates who, after being "briefed by-
surrogate team leaders, would tell reporters that Reagan won, often citing
reasons congruent with Reagan's debate goals. For e.xample, following the
second debate, the most frequent reaction to Reagan's performance was
u- c himself as reasonable and "presidential"—remarkswhich sought to diminish the widespread and gnawing perception that he
was dangerous.
The suiTogate efforts of the competing candidates in Baltimore and
Cleveland is a study of striking contrasts. Reagan's surrogates took control
of the media in Baltimore. Anderson's effort was far less organized, pos
sibly because he ma\' have had diflicultv securing well-known qualified
people to coniment on his behalf. Following the Cleveland debate, how
ever, the thick air of competition between Carter and Reagan on stage was
carried to the post-debate interviews where repre.sentatives from both
camps vied for maximum coverage.
A related effort to control the post-debate media influence of die Cleve
land debate was the establishment of a special Debate Operations Center
at Reagan'.s_ National Headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. During and irn-
niediately following the debate appro.ximately 50 researchers monitored
closely Reagan s and Carter s remarks for errors or omissions which might
draw the media's attention. If, for instance. Carter had made a major factual
error and the quality of Reagan's tiebate performance was in cjuestion
then a representative of the Center would present to the press a refutation!
However, since Reagan and his major advisors were confident, if not ju
bilant, over his perfoimance, they considered it unnecessary to continue
the debate in the press.
Probably the most influential post-debate event was the telephone call-
in poll conducted by ABC. Although Carter s aides were (juick to assail
its methodology and justifiably so—tens of millions of Americans saw
Reagan outdistancing Carter in the poll by a 2 to 1 margin before they
turned off their television sets. Additional millions of voters were exposed
to lead stories about the.se results the following morning in newspapers
and on television news programs.
What the Cleveland Debate did for Reagan
Most analysts and commentators agree that Reagan outi>erformed Carter
th-At he succeeded in making Carter's record the issue of the debate, de
fused the "mad bomber" image, and (as a result of his overall performance)
stemmed Carter's threatening campaign momentum. Most will also agree
with the assessment the President-elect shared with me the dav following
the election: "The debate with Presitlent Carter was, in my view, a critical
element in our success in the election.""
While many explanations have been offered for the widely shared
impression that Reagan outperfonned Carter in Cleveland (and while most
appear cogent), one view shared amongst the members of the debate task
force has not achieved the attention it merits: since Reagan had engaged
toral and Policy Perspectives, eds. George F, Bishop, Robert C. Meadow and Mar
ilyn Jack.son-Beeck (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 81-101,
" Letter, Ronald Reagan to Myles Martel, November .5, 1980.
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in six debates leading up to Cleveland (while Carter had repeatedly
refused to debate since early January), Reagan had become far more
comfortable in the debate setting than Carter. Indeed, the maxim tliat
"there is no substitute for experience" was validated by the Reagan
campaign.
The Future of Presidential Debates
It would be no exaggeration to compare the 1980 presidential debate
preparation process with an advanced game of chess. Nearly every move
regarding the decisions to debate, fomiats, strategies and tactics, and tlie
execution of the debates themselves, was fraught with political implica
tions. One misniove—one untoward statement or look—and the election
could have been lost.
As a fervent advocate of political debates, I left this experience more
convinced than ever that the candidates should retain control of the pro
cess, particularly the decision to debate, scheduling and format design. To
make presidential debates mandatory' and to make a neutral third party
mainly responsible for their preparation raises too great a risk that, inten
tionally or not, one candidate could become favored over the other."'
When the public seriously desires presidential debates, they exercise
considerable pressure on the candidate's campaign strategies. Almost any
canditlate (particularly one in a close race) must reckon with the danger
of damaging publicity resulting from a refusal to debate. The record ot the
1980 presidenHal campaign—both the primary elections and the general
election—suggests that voluntary debates may be more likely to occur.
Certainly, they should be more difficult to avoid.
See Jame.s Karayn, "The Case for Permanent Presidential Debates" in The Past
and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin J. Ranney (Washington: American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), pp. 155-174. For a refutation
of mandatory debates and a discussion of the roie of public pressure in encouraging
debates, see Twentieth Century Fund, With the Nation Watchhig: Report of the
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Televised Presidential Debates (Lexington,
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 77-80.
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THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES:
A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
Patric:ia Riley and Thomas A. Hollihan
The 1980 Presidential election, which some pundits had predicted might
bo so close a contest that it would eiul up being decided in the House of
Representatives,' was instead climaxed by a landslide victors for Repub
lican candidate Ronald Reagan, Not since Franklin Delano Roosevelt
swept Herbert Hoover from office during the Great Depression had the
American people so vehemently rejected a sitting president. The final
outcome left chagrined pollsters, who up until the day of the election had
declared the race too close to call," seeking an explanation. Manv of the
pollsters cited the debate between President Jimmy Carter and challenger
Ronald Reagan as the cause of the dramatic shift in public opinion. Daniel
Yankelovicii, pollster for Time, who had found Carter ahead in his last poll
two weeks prior to the debate, found that public opinion changed radically
after the debate. "The dissatisfaction with Carter was there all along," he
sai<l, "but people couldn't bring themselves to vote for Reagan. The debate
changed all that."-
When debates beb,veen presitlential candidates do occur, they always
seem to become focal p<jints of the election campaign. As important media
events they attract witle public audiences and are also the focus of com
ments by print and liroadcast news analysts, editorialists, and academi
cians, of mans different stripes.
There were two major debates between presidential candidates during
the 1980 campaign. On September 21, 1980, Republican candidate Ronald
Reagan debated independent candidate John Anderson. President Carter
was invitetl to participate but declined.-^ Then on October 28, 1980, Pres
ident Carter and Governor Reagan met to debate. Representative Anderson
was not invited to participate in this debate in part because Carter refused
to debate Anderson unless first given an opportunitv to confront Reagan
in a head-to-head contest.^
PaWcia Rifey is a Lecturer and Thnnias A. Hollihan is an Assi.stant Professor and
the Director of Debate in the Deparhnent of Communication Arts and Sciences at
the University of Southern CiUifornia. The autliors wish to acknowledge the help
ot Richard Kirkhaiii who served a.s the third coder.
' For a time there were fears that iiulependent candidate John Anderson would
capture enough public support to deny either Carter or Reagan the majority of
electoral votes needed for election. In the event of such an instance the House of
Representatives is charged with selecting the president.
' "Anatomy of a Landslide." Time {Nov. 17, 1980), p. 31.
Carter wished to avoid debating both Reagan and Anderson on the same platform
because he believed .Anderson nut to be a legitimate candidate and because he
viewed Anderson as a "spoiler" wluj would draw more votes from him than from
Reagan. To debate Anderson would serve onlv to legitimize his candidacy. See
Howard Rosenberg, "Candidate Debates; The Big Turn-On," Los Anucles Times
18 Sept. 1980, sec. fi, pp. 1, 15. '
' Congressman Anderson was e.xcluded from the October 28th debate bv a ruling
from the League of Women Voters, who sponsored the contests, that to be consid
ered a viable candidate entitled to participation he would need to register at Iea.st
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This study undertakes a content analysis oi" the presidential debates in
order to examine the argument types, evidence use, analysis, and issues
developed by the candidates. The 1980 debates are then compared to
previous presidential debates in tenns of these same criteria.
The Study of Presidential Debating
Communication scholars have a legitimate interest in presidential de
bates. Walter Fisher recently noted that debates: ". . . are the most telling
of all political forms of communication. They give the electorate more of
what it needs to know about presidential hopefuls—more than television
spots, billboards, editorials, pamphlets, speeches, essays or books. In no
other mode of presentation does the candidate risk or reveal so much of
his character."®
Researchers have examined presidential debates from a number of dif
ferent perspectives including: their contribution to voter knowledge,*' their
impact on candidate image," their influence on public agendas,** and their
importance to the flow of public infonntion and the development of public
"meaning."®
Other studies have sought to examine the debates from an irrgumentative
perspective to determine if the debates were, in fact, rational exercises
difTerent in content from other forms of campaign communication. John
Ellsworth, in a content analysis study of the I960 debates, developed a
category system to determine which of the two candidates used the more
rational arguments. Ellsworth found that the I960 debates helped clarify
the campaign issues while offering voters an opportunity to witness the
candidates in "action" as opposed to merely reading a speech. Ellsworth
also found that both Nixon and Kennedy used more evidence and analysis
in developing their arguments iti the debates than they did in other cam
paign situations.'"
In a content analysis of the 1976 presidential debates Riley, Hollihan,
and Cooley used the primary' elements of Ellsworth's category system to
examine the Carter-Ford contests. They found that substantial message
strategy differences existed between the candidates: Carter was far more
15% in the public opinion polls. Some polls in late October were showing Anderson
with as little as 8% support. See William Endicott, "Anderson, Left Out of Debate
Format, Lashes Out at Sponsor. Polls, Carter," Los Angeles Times, 18 Oct. 1980,
sec. 1, p. 32.
» Walter R. Fisher. "Soap Box Derby." University of Southern California Chron
icle (October 1980), p. 3. . r. j .
® A. H. Miller and M, MacKuen, "Infomnng the Electorate: A National Study, in
The Great Debates, Carter vs. Ford, 1976, ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomlngton: Indiana
University Press, 1979), pp. 269-97.
' Jack Dennis, Steven H. Chattee, and Sun Yucl Choe, "Impact on Partisan linage,
and Issue Voting," in The Great Debates (Carter vs. Ford), pp. 314-30,
" Lee B. Becker, David H. Weaver, Doris A. Graber, and Maxwell E. McCoinbs,
"Influences on Public Agendas," in The Great Debates (Carter vs. Ford), pp. 418-
28.
' Samuel L. Becker, Robert Pepper, Lawrence A. Wenner, and Jin Keon Kim,
"Infonnation Flow and the Shaping of Meanings,' in The Great Debates (Carter vs.
Ford), pp. 384-97.
"•John W. Ellsworth, "Rationality and Campaigning; A Content Analysis of the
1960 Presidential Campaign Debates," We,stern Political Quarterly 18 (1965), 794-
802.
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critical of Ford than was Ford of Carter; Ford was imich more defensive
than was Carter; Ford used more evidence than did Carter; and Ford used
more analysis than did Carter. \Vhile Ford made analytical statements and
statements of evidence more frecjuently than did Carter. Carter relied pri
marily on declaratise statements."
This study undertakes an analysis of the 1980 presidential debates like
that completed by Rilcy, Hollihan, aiid Cooley of the 1976 debates. The
argumeiUs and issues are examined to enable comparisons among the can-
tlidates and tt> allow us to search for patterns in the genre of presidential
tiebating.
Method of Analysis
rhis study emplo>s a hand-coded content analysis of the communication
contained in the two 1980 presidential debates. Content analysis is a sys
tematic and vigorous means of describing the use of symbols in public
communication which permits the stiuK' of large (juantities of data in an
orderly fashion.
The ke\- to any content analysis system is the quality of its categories
and the abilit\ of coders (who are familiar with the criteria) to code mes
sages similarly. As Holsti obser\ed: "Systematic means that the inclusion
and exclusion of contettt of categories is done according to consistently
applied rules. This retjuiremcnt clearly eliminates analysis in which onI\'
materials supporting the investigator's hvpotheses are admitted as evi
dence. It also implies that the categories are defined in a manner which
permits them to be used according to consistently applied rules.""
The "theme" was chosen as the unit of analysis. A theme is a single
assertion about some subject. It ma\ be a phrase, a sentence, or a longer
complete thought. Holsti, in a more detailed explanation of its uses, has
cited its advantages and disad\'antages, and suggested the theme as an
appropriate choice for a study of this kind.'-^ The theme is used in this
study because it most accurateK' facilitates the comparison of the candi
dates' discrete statements.
Three coders independently but simultaneously co<led" the themes as
revealed in the written texts of the debates published in the New York
Times.'^ All debate statements were categorized into the following argu
ment types adapted from those developed by Ellsworth:
Analysis: Any statement of a position which is supported by reasoning
and/or a discussion of conse(iuences is classifietl as analysis.
Declaratifm: Any statement by a candidate which neither reasons, nor
offers a discussion of con.se<iuences, nor offers e\"idence for support
of the statement is classified as declaration.
" Patricia Riley. Thomas A. Hollihan, and David M. Cooley. 'The 1976 Presi
dential Debates: An Analysis of the Is.siie.s and Arguments," paper presented at the
Central States Speech Association Convention, Chicago, April, 1980.
" Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Read
ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 14.
" Holsti, p. 116.
" Inter-rater reliability was computed using Scott's index olTeliability: see Holsti
pp. 140^1.
'* The text for the first debate appeared in The New York Times, 23 Sept. 1980,
pp. BIO-II. The te.xt for the second debate appesired in The New York Times, 29
Oct. 1980, pp. .\26-29.
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Evidence: Any statement which utilizes evidence in a non-analytic
fashion, to support any position either specially espoused or as
sumed to be espoused by the candidate is classified as evidence.'®
Additionalls , we were interested (as Ellsworth was in his 1960 debates
study) in identifying those statements which criticized the opponent and
those statements which were in response to criticisms. These sub-cate
gories were labeled critical and defensive statements and were only used
to code remarks directly at, or directly responding to the other candidate.
These categories were not used for remarks directed to the press. In the
Reagan-Anderson debate critical statements were separated into those di
rected at each other and those directed at President Carter (who. of course
was not present). Nine categories of argument types were developed and
statements were coded as either: simple analysis, simple declarative, sim
ple evidence, critical analysis, critical declarative, critical evulence, de
fensive analysis, defensive declarative, or defensive evidence. In this con
text a "simple" statement is one which is neither critical nor defensive.
The themes were also simultaneously categorized according to their
manifest content—operationally defined as the issues they addressed. For
example, if Reagan stated: "Our unemployment rate under this adminis
tration is higher than this nation can stand!" the statement was coded as
a critical declarative argument on the economy. The issue categories were
determined bv the coders' analysis of the issues discussed in the debates.
If the categories were found to overlap, they were combined or inade more
specific. Every attempt was made to ensure that the category titles accu
rately reflected the statements they represented and to make them mu
tually exclusive. The invesHgators found that the following categories rep
resented the issues in the two debates:
Energy: This category deals with energy shortages, energy sources,
energy programs, conservation, and the environment.
Foreign Relations: This categor\ covers general foreign policy issues
such as United States' influence in the worlil, foreign trade, detente,
treaties, and international agicements.
Economy: This categorv- contains stiitements concerning inflation, un-
emplovinent, taxes, and government waste.
Big Government: This category contains statements concerning goy-
ennnent regulation, responsiveness to citizen needs, bureaucratic
structures, and anti-Washington sentiments.
Militarv: This categor\' deals with American military power and
strength in general. It also deals with statements conceniing nuclear
weapons and new weapons systems. It also included statements
concerning the domestic implications of military issues.
Svmbolic America: This category contains references to our nation or
to our democratic heritage. It encompasses the pursuit of peace,
prestige, nationalism, and the character of the American people.
Religion: This category contains statements regarding the separation
of church and state, the role of religion and religious leaders in the
American political svstem, and moral issues such as abortion.
Presidenbal Campaign/Leadership: This category contains statements
about the candidate's actions and attributes, personal criticisms by
one candidate to another, remarks about the campaign, and tlie na
ture of presidential leadership and the presidency.
Ellsworth, p. 79,5.
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The category system thus permitted each theme to be simultaneously cod-
eti in an argument-type and an issue categoiy.
The content analysis provides the data tor answering the following gen
eral research (luestions; Brst, how do the candidates compare in terms of
use ot anah sis, evidence, and declarative statements? Second, which of
the candulates seemed to be the most critical of his opponents and which
seemed most defensive? Third, how do the two debates compare in terms
of issues, types of arguments, candidate aggressiveness, candidate defen-
Mveness and the use of evidence, anahsis, and declarative statements?
h inally, how do these dei>ates compare to those of 1960 and 1976 in terms
of the use of evidence, analysis, declarative statements, candidate aggres
siveness, and candidate defensiveness?
We ask these questions in order to gain insight into a number ofdifferent
aspects of the debates. First, those who emphasize the importance of pres-
idmitial debates to the election process do so out of the conviction that
debates are more rational than other t> pes of campaign events. A content
analysis of the debates provides the data necessary to determine whether
or not the debates actually contain rational arguments supported bv evi
dence or analysis.
Second the number of critical and defensive statements is also of inter-
est. Candidates strive to demonstrate that they perceive the weaknesses
of their opponents and that they do not possess those same weaknesses
The conventional wisdom of campaign strategists is that candidates must
be ver>' cautious m criticizing their opponents, or they mav appear to be
vindictive and unfair. Likewise, candidates must defend thennselves
against criticisms leveleil at them by their opponents but must not appear
overly defensive.
Third, h)- comparing the 1980 deliates with those of 1960 and 1976 a
number of observations about the cfifferences or similarities among these
contests become possible. As debates take place over time, perhaps ex
pected behaviors and strategies will develop. These anticipated behaviors
may fielp explain public reactions to the debates. Since this sear's contest
involved Presideiit Carter in the role of incumbent rather than challenger
.stilJ other compari.sons are possible due to his eluuige in role. In the 1976
debates against incumbent President Ford, Carter ss-as vers' critical of his
lyponent s record. In the 1980 debate we can observe s^hether or not
Carter as an incumbent must suddenly become defensive now that it is his
own record being criticized.
Results
The overall inter-rater relial)ilit>- level, eomputod using Scott's index of
reliability, was .91 tor the two debates.
The data from the two debates are discussed us percentages of themes
in a category. As all statements in both delrates were coded (as opposed
tcyising siimples), the resulting percentages are directiv comparable. In
addition, chi-sqiuire tests ot significant differences between the candiilates
were performed for each category. For a difference between candidates to
be regarded as staHstieally significant in this study, it must he at the p =
,()o le\'el.
The results from the first deirate between Governor Reagan and Rep
resentative John Antlerson showed the candidates to be ver\ similar in
their use of argument types (see Table 1). Specificallv, we discovered thcv
were similar in their use of declarative statements (about 62% for each
debater) and evidence statements (approximatelv 22% for Reagan and 25%
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Table 1. Analysis, evidence and declarative statements in the Reagan-Anderson
debate.
Type of statement Anderson Reagan
Analytical statements 13.4% 16.7%
Evidence statements 24.8% 21.6%
Declarative statements 61.7% 61.9%
Totals: 99.9% IQO.2%
Note: totals exceed and fall short of 100% due to rounding off individual per
centages.
for Anderson). In their use of analysis, the difference between Reagan's
16.7% and .Anderson's 13.4% is still not remarkable. The difference be
tween their criticism of President Carter (almost 6% for Reagan and nearly
11% for Anderson) was the most notable of the comparisons.
The categories which seem to be most interesting are the total critical
statements and total defensive statements—computed across the declara
tive, analytical, and evidence categories (see Table 2). The critical themes
showed quite a difference with Anderson being critical 29% of the time,
but Reagan using critical statements only 1.3% of the time. Defensive state
ments, however, were used 9% of the time by Reagan but only about 3%
of the time by Anderson (see Table 2). The difference in critical statements
is statistic^dly significant at the .01 level (df = 1, x' = 9.62). For a break
down of statements into all nine categories, see Table 3.
The is.sue content compaj'ison.s followed the same pattern with little
discrimination between the candidates on most of the issues. The only two
issue categories which appear to have been important in distinguishing
between Reagan and Anderson were "Presidential Campaign/Leadership
and "Symbolic America." These were the only two issue categories in the
Reagan-Anderson debate to show statistically significant differences be
tween the candidates (see Table 4). Reagan jnade a significantly greater
use of the "Symbolic America" categor>' (with over 17% of his statements
in this area) than did Anderson with only about 2% of his remarks so coded
(df = I, X' = 17.28, p < .01). In contrast, Anderson devoted significantly-
more of his statements to the issue of the "Presidential Campaign/Lead
ership" (nearly 11%) than did Reagan (1.4%) who virtually ignored this
issue (df = 1, X' - 11-57, p < .01).
In the second debate (Carter vs. Reagan) the content analysis pointed
out more argument and issue differences than were found in the previous
debate (see Tables 5 and 6). In examining tire data on argument types, one
Table 2. Critical and defensive statement.s in the Reagan-Anderson debate.
Type of statement Anderson Reagan
Critical statements* 29.1% 13.2%
Defen.sive statements 2.8% 9.0%
Direct statements 68.1% 77.8%
Totals: 100.0% 100.0%
• Significant at alpha = .01.
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Table 3. Analysis of the content of the Reagan-Anderson debate.
Type of statement
Simple analysis
Simple evidence
Simple declarative
Critical analysis
Critical evidence
Critical declarative
Defensive analysis
Defensive evidence
Defensive declarative
Critical declarative on Carter
Critical analysis on Carter
Critical evidence on Carter
Totals:
Anderson Reagan
7.1% 13.9%
17.7% 16,7%
43.3% 47.2%
3.5% 1.4%
4.3% 0.7%
10.6% 5.6%
0 0
0.7% 3.5%
2.1% 5.6%
5.7% 3.5%
2.8% 1.4%
2.1% 0.7%
99.9% 100.2%
Note: Totals exceed and fall short of 100% due to rounding off individual per
centages. For the purposes of this chart, "simple" analysis refers to an analytic
statement which is neither critical nor defensive. The same interpretation applies
to simple ' evidence and "simple" declarative.
discovers that Reagan used declarative statements in aljout 59% of his
themes while Carter usetl them nearly 74% of the time. In the analysis
category, Reagan (with 11%) was significantlv ahead of Carter who used
less than «% analviical themes (df = I, x' = 4.68, p < .05). In using evi
dence, Reagan again significantly outstripped Carter almost 30% to less
than 21% (df= 1, = 4..54, p < .05).
In checking the use of critical and defensive statements, we found that
Reagan s themes were critical in 45% of his statements as opposed to Car
ter whose themes were critical only 27% of the time. This constitutes a
statistically significant difference (df = \ ,x^ = 11.84, p < .01). Reagan also
was significantly more defensive than was Carter by 16% to 8% (df = 1
= 7.95, p < .01).
Table 4. Issues in the Reagan-Anderson debate.
Issue Anderson Reagan
Energy 12.1% 13.9%
Foreign relations 1.4% 0
Economy 46.1% 44.4%
Big government 3..5% 6.3%
Military 14.9% 10.4%
Symbolic America* 2.1% 17.4%
Religion 9.2% 6..3%
Presidential campaign and
presidential leadership* 10.6% 1.4%
Totals: 99.9% 100.1%
Note: Totals exceed and fall short of 100% due to rounding off individual per
centages.
* Significant at alpha = .01.
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Table 5. Analysis, evidence and declarative statements in the Reagan-Carter de
bate
Type of statement Carter Reagan
Analytic sUiteinents'
Evidence statements*
Declarative statements
Totals
5.7%
20.7%
7.3.6%
100,0%
11.0%
29.9%
59.1%
100.0%
Significant at alpha = .05.
Among the specific types of argument, simple declarative themes and
critical evidence themes showed large differences between the candidates
(see Table 7). Carter used simple declarative themes almost 48% of the
time while Reagan used them only about 28% of the time, which proved
to be a statistically significant difference (df = 1, == 11.89, p < .01). In
contrast, Reagan's statements were categorized as critical evidence more
often than Carter's statements (approximately 18% to 6%), which consti
tuted another significant difi'erence (df = 1, x^ = 16.83, p < .01).
The analysis of issue categories in the second debate showed that the
candidates differed in the emphasis that they gave to various topics (see
Table 8). Carter focused on the energ>- issue in nearly 15% of his state
ments while it was the topic of only about 8% of Reagan's statements. In
contrast, Reagan dealt with the economy in over 36% of his themes but
Carter only had about 22%^ of his themes in this category. Finally, Carter
made more use of the "Symbolic America" category (approximately 11%
to 4%) and made more use of the "Presidential Campaign/Leadership"
categoiA- (about 21% to 14%) than did Reagan. As it developed, only the
difference between Carter and Reagan on the economic topic proved to
be statistically significant (df = 1. x* = 9.02, p < .01).
Table 6. Critical and defensive statements in the Reagan-Carter debate.
Type of statement Carter Reagan
Critical stiitements* 27% 45%
Defensive statements* 8% 16%
Direct statements 65% 39%
Totals: 1(X)% 100%
* Significant at alpha = .01.
Discussion
The Reagan-Anderson Debate
The first debate between Governor Reagan and Congressman Anderson
was characterized b\ the media as an event which pointed out striking
differences in the candidates' positions on the issues.'* The data reported
in this study suggest that Anderson did confonn to his pre-debate strategy
of establishing himself as a clear alternative to Governor Reagan by illu-
Jack Nelson, "Anderson and Reagan Differ on Most Issues." Los Angeles Times,
22 Sept. 1980, p. I.
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Table 7, Analysis of the content of the Reagan-Carter debate.
Type of statement Carter Reagan
Simple analysis 3.4% 2.0%
Simple evidence 13.8% 8.6%
Simple declarative* 47.9% 28.3%
Critical analy.sis 1.5% 6.1%
Critical eviiience* 6.1% 18.4%
Critical declarative 19.2% 20.1%
defensive analysis 0.8% 2.9%
Defensive evidence 0.8% 2.9%
Defensive declarative 6.5% 10.7%
Totals: 100.0% 100.0%
* Significant at alpha = ,01.
Note: For the purposes of this chart, "simple analysis refers to an analytic state
ment which is neither critical nor defensive. The same interpretation applies to
"simple" evidence and "simple" declarative.
minating their fliflering positions on the issues. But this analysis ahso re
veals diat Anderson's and Reagan's debating .styles differed as well.
\Miile Reagan and Anderson showed ver\- siiniiar use of the three ba.sic
argument tyi>es—evidence, declarative, and anaK sis statements—the tenor
of their arguments dilTered greatly . Anderson's statements were critical of
Rpigan in 29% of his coded themes. This was more than twice the mimfjer
of statements in which Reagan was critical of Anderson (13%:). While news-
paiDer reports noted that the candidates' debatijig styles differed,'" this was
mainly attributed to Anderson's formalit}' and precision. This analysis sug-
ge.sts the large gap between Anderson's and Reagan's use of critical state
ments could be Iargel\- responsible for the perceived stvle differences.
The large nuinher of critical statements made by Anderson also probal)ly
accounts for the fact that Reagan had three times as many defensive themes
as .Anderson {9% to 3%), Since this is still a small percentage of the ar
guments in the forum, Reagan did nr)t allow Anderson's critical tone to put
him on the defensive throughout the debate—a position no candidate de
sires.
Anderson's strategy to use the debate to distinguish himself from Rea
gan, and not as a forum to attack Carter'^ was reasonably followed. Only
11% of Anderson's statements were critical of President Carter. Reagan
was even less critical of Carter (only 6% of the time), tlms allowing An
derson the role of the aggressive challenger.
The candidates stayed with each other on most of the issue topics, clearly
comparing their records and positions on the various issues. This analysis
found there was little difference in their attention to the topics except in
the "Symboiie America" calegors and "President Campaign/Leadership"
category. This sariance ina\' well point out what the press referred to as
Anderson's humorless technician st\ Ie and Reagan's foiksx, good-humored
style.^" Reagan had 17% of his statements in the ".Symbolic America" cat-
'I topic area which encompasses the goodnes.s of the American char-
"Jack Nelson and Robert Shogan. "Who Won:' Three Candklates Gained, Lost
in Debate," Ltis Angeles Times, 23 Sept. 1980, p. p. 1.
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Table 8. Issues in the Reagan-Carter debate.
Issues Carter Reagan
Energ>' 14.6% 8.2%
Foreign relations 18.4% 17.2%
Economy* 21.8% 36.1%
Big government 5.4% 9.8%
Militarv 8.4% 10.2%
Symbolic America 10.7% 4.1%
Religion 0 0
Pre.sidential campaign and
14.3%Presidential leadership 20.7%
Totals: 100.0% 99.9%
ages.
" Significant at alpha = .01.
acter, the high moral nature of our values and ideal.s, and Ainerica's rightful
place in histor\' as well as our role in the future of the world. In contrast,
only 2% of Anderson'.s statements were in this topic area. Always practical,
Anderson instead chose to make an issue of the presidential campaign and
of presidential leadership. He had 11% of his statements focusing on this
issue while Reagan spoke on this topic only 1% of the time. Anderson was
stressing this topic, no doubt, because he was attempting to convince the
American people that his candidacy was a serious and a legitimate one,
and that in this instance they should not think about their part>' identifi
cation in casting their ballots, but should think about the skills that the
man in the White House needs to possess. Of course, the candidates abil
ity to address certain types of issues was limited to some extent by the
questions posed to them by the panel ofjournalists. Nevertheless, all three
debaters demonstrated considerable dexterity in weaving their own agen
das into responses to journalists (juestions.
Overall, the analysis of the first of the 1980 presidential debates found
Reagan and Anderson using similar amounts of anaK sis and evidence, but
the tone of their arguments was quite different. Anderson was far more
aggressive and critical of his opponents than was Reagan. In addition,
Reagan appealed primarily to the national pride and character of the
American people, while Anderson emphasized more pragmatic issues.
The Reafiou-Cat'ter Debate
The second debate of the 1980 presidential campaign pitted incumbent
President Jimmy Carter against challenger Governor Ronald Reagan. Car
ter finally had Reagan where he had claimed that he wanted Reagan: "in
a head-to head debate, with no third candidate, and the election hanging
in the balance."^' His strategy reportedly was to look "presidential"—to
Jack Nelson and Bill Stall, "Reagan, Anderson to Aim at Each Other in Debate,
Not Carter," Los Angeles Times, 21 Sept. 1980, part 1, p. 5.
Nelson and Shogan, p. I.
" David S, Broder, "The Power of Looking Presidential," Los Angeles Times, 27
Oct. 1980, part 2, p. 9.
48
Speaker & Gavel, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1
https://cornerstone.lib.mnsu.edu/speaker-gavel/vol18/iss2/1
SPEAKER AND GAVEL 57
look like the person who is more knowletlgeable and has the facts about
the cold realities of the world.-^ Given this strategy , one might expect to
see Carter using much more analysis and evidence than his opponent.
Instead, Reagan used significantly more analysis and significantly more
evidence in his arguments than did Carter. Carter ended up relying on
assertions (simple declarative statements) rather than on reasoning or facts.
As the incumbent, Carter als{> had a record that was open to attack.
Reagan made use of this opportunity and was far more critical of Carter's
policies and positions than Carter was of Reagan's policies and positions.
Carter did not allow Reagan to put him on the defensive, however, as Rea
gan used twice as many defensive statements as did Carter. These data
could also indicate that Reagan was more specific in refuting Carter's alle
gations, while Carter chose to ignore Reagan's arguments rather than rebut
them.
The argument categor>' which seems most telling is that of critical evi
dence themes. Reagan used three times the amount of claims supported
by evidence to criticize Carter and his administration than Carter used to
criticize Reagan and his policies. This is clearly demonstrated in Reagan's
economic arguments, Not only was the econoiny the only issue category
which showed significant differences between the candidates, but more
critical evitlence was used with regard to economic arguments than on any
other single issue. Carter, however, did not focus as heavily on the econ
omy, preferring to talk about energv. Again, these data are probably relat
ed—with Carter using the energy issue to help explain his administration's
problems with the economy. Regiudless of his motives, however. Carter
clearly had problems in the debate in his attempts to respond to Reagan's
economic indictments of his administration.
The only other issues which showed important differences were "Sym
bolic America" and "Presidential Campaign/Leadership." Since Reagan
was using evidence in specific attacks on the economy. Carter attempted
to establish his position in areas where he as an incumbent would have
natural credibility. He thus made repeated references to how much closer
he felt to the American people since he had served as their president and
to the knowledge and experience he had gained in his four-year term. This
is consistent with the expressed strategy of Carter's advisors who felt Rea
gan could he portrayed as not really understanding the complex problems
of the presi<Iency and as unprepared for these responsibilities.-'^
While Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter debated in Cleveland, John
Anderson held his own debate in Washington, shadow-boxing the televi
sion images of tlie other two candidates after being excluded from their
show. One might initially assume that the absence of Anderson probably
did little to change Reagan's debate strategy because .Anderson was not
expected to draw many votes from Reagan. The data from this study, how
ever, suggest that the absence of Anderson ma\' indeed have changed
Reagan s debating tactics somewhat. In the only major change from the
first debate to the second, Reagan shiftetl from being far less critical than
Anderson in the first debate, to being far more critical than Carter in the
.second debate. The presence in the debate of an incumbent with a record
that was vulnerable to criticism was the most likely explanation for Rea
gan s change in strategy. While not as dramatic, nor as obvious, Reagan
" Broder, part 2, p. 9.
^ Robert Shogan, Battle Lines for Tonight s Debate Set," Los Angeles Times,
28 Oct. 1980, p. 1.
49
et al.: Complete Issue 18(2)
Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2018
58 SPEAKER AND GAVEL
also practically doubled his refutations to arguments in the second debate,
taking greater care to answer Carter's criticisms of him than he had with An
derson's criticisms. We must acknowledge, however, that this difference
might also be attributable to a change in format which allowed the can
didates more time ibr rebutting arguments.
In general, the second debate found Carter stressing the importance of
"presidential leadership," and being criticized for his handling of the
economy." All other conclusions about the debate, however, might pale
in comparison to Carter's comment about daughter Amy's views on nuclear
war and Reagan's reminiscing about a nation that did not know it had
a race problem. While content analysis is systematic, it cannot measure
the impact of particular symbolic statements.
1980 Debates vs. the 1976 ami 1960 Debates
Direct comparisons across debates from different elections are always
difficult as formats change, the issues var>', campaign contexts differ, and
the research methods advance. Since presidential debating is still such a
new genre of election campaigning, however, comparisons and the search
for trends and patterns are important research areas.^^
The most striking shift from the 1976 debates to the 1980 debates was
a return to the direct responses found in the Nixon-Kennedy debates. The
percentages of defensive comments in the 1980 debates were much more
analogous to the 1960 <lebates than to the 1976 debates, perhaps respond
ing to media criticisms that the 1976 debates bore little resemblance to
debate as a forum for arguments and counter-arguments.
The second characteristic of the 1980 debates was another return to the
style of the 1960 debates with the advocates relying much more on evi
dence to support their claims than they had in the 1976 debates. It is also
noteworthy that the advocates used more analysis in developing their ar
guments in the 1980 debates than was used in the 1976 debates. Wliile it
is not possible for us to e.xplain this greater reliance on evidence and
analysis, it is praiseworthy. This analysis would suggest that the 1980 de
bates more resembled actual argumentative confrontations than the 1976
debates did.
Finally, the changes in Carter's use of arguments are noteworth\' as he
became the first candidate to participate in presidential debates in separate
elections. Carter was far more critical of his opponents as a challenger (in
1976) than as an incumbent (in 1980). He focused on the economy much
more often when it was Ford's burden and not his own; this seems to be
the topic to be exploited by the challenger and to be avoided by the in
cumbent. Carter did not, however, change his grass roots appeals; his calls
to the American people's consciences, their pride, and their sense of love
for their country were die same in 1980 as they had been in 1976. Appar
ently, however, in 1980 they were not enough. The changing times can
also be captured in slight but incredibly telling ways. Watergate and the
ethics of those in power was an important issue in the Carter-Ford debates.
It was no longer an issue in the Carter-Reagan debate.
The following comparison of the 1980, 1976 and 1960 presidential debates is
based upon the data of the present study as well as data reported in Ellsworth,
•'Rationality and Campaigning"; and Riley, Hollihiui, and Cooley, "The 1976 Pres
idential Debates."
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As presidenUal debates appear to have l)een institutionalized with the
precedent set for incumbent presidents to participate, further research into
dieir nature and effects is necessary. Most earl\- polls of the 1980 debatesjudged them to be draws, l)ut their eventual impact on the campaign
was claime<l to be much greater by many post-election analysts." The
relationship between candidates abilities to effectively argue their posi
tions and the winning or losing of an election is obviously an area desen'-
ing intense investigation. This study is a start.
Goodwin Berciuist and Janie.s Golden point out that the media presented a
second wave' of debate evalualion.s beginning a few days after the event and
continuing until the election. This second wave" of news reports uniformly de
clared Reagan the winner ol the debate. See Beniiiist and Golden. ".Media Rhe'toric
Cnticism and the Public Perception of the 1980 Presidential Debates," Oucirterlu
Journal of Speech, 87 1981), in press.
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HOW REAGAN "WON" THE CLEVELAND DEBATE:
AUDIENCE PREDISPOSITIONS AND
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE "WINNERS"
Davio a. Leuthold and David C. Valentine
Debates have been held in three of the last six presidential elections.
Usually candidates will agree to debate only when the election is close
and when they see an opportunity to win votes by debating. Thus, while
debates may have other functions such as informing voters, they occur
because each candidate is trying to implement his campaign strategy. The
goal is to win votes.
Our thesis is that candidates win votes not only by their debate perfor
mance but also by being declared the winner. The media declare the
winners largelv on the basis of the surveys of viewers immediately follow
ing the debate, and those surveys have shown that supporters of a candi
date are likely to say that their candidate won the debate. In I960 and
1976 approximately equal proportions of supporters for each candidate
watched the debate. But in 1980 Reagan supporters were a little more
likelv to watch, so that Reagan was a little more likely to "win," all other
things being equal. This difference, which was important but not critical
in 1980, alerts us to the importance of audience predispositions as a de
terminant of who won the debate.
Academic commentators on presidential debates sometimes decry the
media's effort to declare a "winner" because it tends to transform an event
which the sponsors hoped would be educational into a kind of contest.'
While such objections have some merit, it would be difficult (if not im
possible) to stifle the search for debate "winners" by broadcast and printjournalists—and by the candidates themselves. Presidential debates are
political events and politicians certainly appreciate the importance of
being declared "the winner" in surveys of viewers.
In 1980 the Carter camp reportedly feared that it might "lose" a debate
in terms of immediate public opinion polls and therefore wanted the
Reagan-Carter debate to take place at least a week before the election so
that they could counter the impression that Reagan had won. Carter s polls
ter, Patrick Caddell, remarked to one journalist shortly after the debate:
"We learned in '76 that people are driven by who they think other people
think won the debate—by what they hear about who's the winner. That
especially helped Carter in '76. That's why we wanted this debate as early
as possible—because we'd be seen as losing, and we d need more time [to
recoverj."-
David Leuthold is Professor of Political Science and Chaimian of the Department
of Political Science, University of .Missouri-Columbia. David Valentine holds a
Ph.D. in political science and is a member of the research staff of the Missouri
Senate.
' See, for example, Goodwin F. Berquist and James L. Golden, "Media Rhetoric,
Griticism, and the Public Perception of the 1980 Presidential Debates, Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 67 (May 1981), in press.
* Gaddell as quoted by Elizabeth Drew in "A Reporter at Large—1980: The Elec
tion," The New Yorker, Dec. 1, 1980, p. 179.
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As one of Reagan's debate advisors points out elsewhere in this issue,
campaign carefully orchestrated post-debate evaluations by
their spokesmen to encourage the preception diat Reagan had "won."^
Presumably, the Carter campaign was doing the same thing.
In short, so long as there are presidential debates, there will be a natural
and probably irresistible tlrive to promptK- detennine a "winner." This
being the case, both political practitioners and observers need a basis for
predicting who will win. In this regard, audience predispositions seem
a ke\' factor.
The Importance of Audience Predispositions
Although analyses of prev ious presidential debates have given little at
tention to the predispositions of the audience, the importance of those
predispositions is suggested by various sources. One is the literature on
persuasion. The theoretical model for anaK sis of persuasion constructed
by Irving Janis includes tlie predispositions of the audience as an important
factor, along with the characteristics of the message, communicator, media
and situation.' Raymond Bauer expanded upon this point by noting that
-some efforts to change people's views had the unintended effect of rein
forcing the original predispositions.''
The importance of preilispositions has also been demonstrated in voter
behavior research. Study after study has found party loyaltv to be a dom
inant factor, with attempts at persuasion having limited effect." A study of
the 1948 election, for example, found that the percent of voters who
switched to the opposite party between August and November was iden
tical (9 percent) among those who were contacted by a worker from the
opposite party, among those contacted b\ a worker from their own p<uty,
and among those contacted by neither party.'
Studies of presidential debates suggest that their principal effect is to
reinforce the viewer's predispositions. Elihu Katz and Jacob Feldman re
viewed five different studies that asked about pre- and post-debute attitudes
toward the 19b() candidates. The studies showed that 25 to 57 percent of
the Republicans became more favorable toward Nixon after the debate
while only 6 to 25 percent became more favorable to Kennedy. Similarly,
23 to 72 percent of the Democrats became more favorable to Kennedy
^ See Myles Martel, "Debate Preparati<nis in the Reagan Camp: An Insider's
View earlier in this issue of Speaker and Gavel.
* Irving L. Janis, "Persuasion," in Internatiunal Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
cnce.i, ed, David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan Company and The Free Press
1968), vol. 12, p. 57. '
* Rav'inond A. Bauer, The Obstinate Audience: The Influence Process from the
Point of View of Social Communication," Ainericaii Psychologist 19 (May 1964),
" See, for example, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The
Peoples Choice: How the Voter .Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign
(.New York: Columbia University Press, 1944); Benuird R. Berelson. Paul F. La
zarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Sivdy of Opinion Fonnation in a
Pre.ddeniial Campaign (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954); and An
gus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The
American Voter (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960).
' Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Voting, p. 175.
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while only 11 to 15 percent became more favorable to Nixon." This ten
dency is rooted in the well established communication phenomenon of
selective perception by audience members. As a natural result of the view
ers' desire to maintain a balance among cognitions, they will selectively
attend to televi.sed presidential debates and will tend to remember that
which is consistent with their predispositions concerning the candidates."
Research on the debates has also indicated that the supporters of each
candidate are likely to conclude that their candidate won. Despite the
consensus from fifteen different studies that in 1976 Ford had won the first
debate and Carter the second and third, surveys taken after each debate
by Associated Press and by Public Broadcasting System/Roper found sup
porters asserting that their candidate won. In each case at least 56 percent
of the candidate's supporters said that he won, and tio more than 32 percent
said that his opponent won, despite the substantial variations in candidate
perfonnance.'" Similarly. Katz and Feldman, in summarizing the 1960 lit
erature concluded that "there is a marked tendency to choose one's own
candidate as the winner."" In eight different surveys from which they
drew data, the median percentage of Republicans or Nixon supporters who
thought Nixon won the first debate was 42 percent, while the median
percentage who thought Kennedy won was 17 percent. Among Democrats
or Kennedy supporters, the median percentage who thought Kennedy won
was 68 percent, while the median percentage who thought Nixon won was
4 percent.
In sum, viewing presidential debates tends to maintain or reinforce pre
vious positive or negative attitudes toward the candidates. Consecjuently,
assuming the two candidates' performance is roughly equivalent, viewers
tend to report that their favored candidate won the debate.
Application to the Carter-Reagan Debate
These patterns were repeated in 1980. The reinforcement of previously
held views was demonstrated in research we conducted at the University
of Missouri-Columbia (UMC). Fifty-five respondents, almost all college
students and mostl> junior and senior political science majors, watched
the Carter-Reagan debate together and completed questionnaires before
and after the debate. One question asked was, "If he is elected, how good
or poor a president do you think (Carter/Reagan) will make during the
« Elihu Katz and Jacob j. Feldman, "The Debates in the Light of Research: A
Survey of Surveys," in The Great Debates: Background^erspective—Effects, ed.
Sidney Kraus (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), pp. 206-207. See dso
Jaines'A. Anderson et ai, "An Analysis of Changes in Voter Perception of Candidate
Positions," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Speech Communicatioii
Association, Dec. 1977, Washington. D.C.; and Alan Abramowitz, "The Impact of
a Presidential Debate on Voter Rationality." American Journal of Political Science,
22 (1978), 680-690.
" For a study of the impact of the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates which supports
these generalizations, see Hans Sebold, "Limitations of Communication: Mecha
nisms of Image Maintenance in the Form of Selective Perception, Selective Mem
ory, and Selective Distortion," Journal of Communication. 12 (1962), 142-149.
David O. Sears and Steven H. Chaffee, "Uses and Effects of the 1976 Debates:
An Overview of Empirical Studies." in The Great Debates : Carter vs. Ford, 1976,
ed Sidney Kraus (Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1979), pp. 237-239.
" Katz and Feldman, "The Debates in the Light of Research," pp. 198-199.
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198J-1985 tenn? Before the debate, 74 percent of the students estimated
that tlieir favored candidate would be either "sj)niewhat good" or "very
good," while only 5 percent judged that his opponent would be "somewhat
good" or "ver\- good," After the debate, positive evaluations of the favored
candiilate increased slightK to 77 percent, but the evduations of the op
ponent remained unchanged.
The tendency of supporters to assert that tlieir own candidate had won
was also found in other public opinion data in 1980. A CBS News national
surve\- found that 82 percent of the viewers who supported Reagan thought
that he hail won. Of those who supported Carter beforehand, 69 percent
thought that he had won the deirate.'* These data indicate that viewers are
not impartial debate judges but partisans who find themselves more in
agreement with their candidate's arguments thati with his opponent's state
ments. During the course of the debate, UMC students were asked to score
how convinced or impressed the\ were by each statement b\- each can
didate. Viewers consistently gave their preferred candidate higher scores
than they gave the opposing candidate. "This consistent reinforcement will
enhance each viewers support for his own candidate.
Finally, the 1980 data showed one other pattern of distinct importance—
Reagan supporters were more likel> than Carter supporters to watch the
debate. The CBS News surv ev found that 86 percent of the Reagan sup
porters watched the debate compared with 81 percent of the Carter sui>-
porters. Furthcnnore, Reagan supporters were more likely to watch all
ninet>' minutes of the debate.''' The Associated Press survey data were not
as specific, but the patterns were apparently the same, the Associated
Press reported that Reagan's victori was "principally the product of more
Reagan supporters watching the debate than Carter backers."'^
The genera! findings can be summarized as: 1) e.xposure to the debate
reinforces opinions; 2) supporters tend to report that their candidate won;
and 3) an imbalance e.visted between the proportion of Reagan and Carter
supporters in the audience. These findings help to e.xplain Reagan's suc
cess in the 1980 debate. Reagan was declared the winner iiv four different
surves s conducted immediately following the debate. CBS News and As
sociated Press each inter\iewed people before the debate and reinter-
viewed afiout one thousand people immediately afterward. CBS found that
44 percent of the viewers thought Reagan had won. while 36 percent
thought Carter had won. For the .Associated Press the figures were 44
percent to .34 percent in favor of Reagan. In a phone-in survey conducted
b\' AB(> News, 727,328 viewers favored Reagan by a two-to-one margin as
the candidate who "gained most by his performance in the debate." View
ers of Warner Amex's Qube system in Columbus, Ohio, thought (by a
margin of two and a half to one) that Reagan had won. The importance of
the predispositions of the audience was indicated by the fact that the Qube
audience divided two to one for Reagan before the debate.
The tliscoverv' of the difference in the predispositions of the viewing
audience in 1980 led us to review the data on audience preferences in
earlier debates. Katz anil Feldman noted .se\ eral studies that found almost
eipially high proportions of Nixoti and Kennedi' .supporters watching the
"CBS Ncw.s Poll October 1980 FresidenHai Debate," CBS News Release, Oct.
29, 1980,
Ihid.
"Debate Gains Split Equally," St. Umis Globe-Democrat, 30 Oct. 1980, p. lA,
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1960 debates."' Similarly, our own analysis of the 1960 and 1976 surveys
conducted by the University of Michigan indicated that nearly one-half of
the audience supported each of the debaters in the earlier debates."'
This information on debate viewers clearly suggests that some unusual
characteristics of tlie 1980 campaign contributed to the larger proportion
of Reagan supporters watching the debate and, hence, to the perception
that Reagan won. The unique feature of the 1980 campaign was the can
didacy of Ronald Reagan. According to pollster Lou Harris, Reagan sup
porters tended to be more intense in support ol their candidate than were
Carter supporters.'^ This intensity of commibnent would have made Rea
gan supporters more likely to watch the debate and more likely to watch
all of it, more likely to call ABC to report tlicir preference and, we suspect,
more likely to claim that their candidate had won the debate.
That Reagan supporters are more intense is not a new phenomenon.
Data drawn from the 1976 national survey conducted by the University of
Michigan, using the "feeling thermometer," revealed that Reagan voters
in the primaries were more supportive ol their candidate than were those
voting for Carter or Ford. The intensity of Reagan's supporters reflects the
characteristics of the groups that .served as the base for his candidacy.
Throughout his long campaign for the presidency, Reagan drew upon the
more conservative wing of the Republican partv* for his support. Previous
research has demonstrated that conservatives and Republicans are more
active in politics than are otlier groups.'"
Effects of Media Analysis
We have reviewed evidence suggesting that Reagan supporters were
more likely to watch the debate and that their support for Reagan helped
make him the winner ol tlie debate as declared by the media. But did this
declaration help Reagan win votes? Ted Koppel of ABC News maintained
that the onlv intent of the ABC phone-in survey was to elicit an "honest,
(luick reaction" and that he did not believe that the survey had affected
the elecbon.'®
Research on previous debates, however, has indicated that media anal
yses do affect viewer attitudes. Steven Chalfee and Jack Dennis, after
reviewing the relevant research literature, conclude that popular percep
tions of Ford's victoiy in the first debate, and of Carters in the second,
were much stionger the day following each debate than on the previous
evening immediately after the debate ended. It may well be that the
press's interpretation of the debate, ba.sed on its initial information as to
Katz anil Feldinan, "The Debates in the Light of Research," p. 191.
These data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Polit
ical Research, originally collected hy the Survey Research Center at the University
of Michigan. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the consortium bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented in this article.
" "ABC Takes Flak for Po.st-Debate Phone Survey," Broadcasting (Nov. 3, 1980),
p. 25.
See Philip Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Wiuren E. .Miller, "Electoral Myth
and Reality: The 1964 Election," American Political Science Review, 59 (1965),
332-335; and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political
Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 224—228.
"ABC Takes Flak for Post-Debate Phone Survey," p. 25.
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tile apparent victor, is more important in determining the impact on the
electorate than is the debate itself."^"
Certainly this conclusion is suppr)rted by the analyses of the second
197b debate, in which viewers polled immediately after the debate thought
Fortl had won, while viewers polled after a day of media commentar\-
about Ford's gaffe concerning the independence of Eastern Europe
thought Carter had won.-' Similarly, the effect of the immediate media
aiiaK sis ma> have been reflected in the ABC-Lou Harris survey, conducted
the evening after the debate, which found tlial \'iewers considered Reagan
the winner by a 46 percent to 26 percent margin.^- This margin, greater
than tliat found in the earlier Associated Press and CBS News polls, may
have reflected the increased awareness by the public that other people
considered Reagan the winner.
These points, however, do not prove that Reagan won votes b\ being
declared the debate winner by the media. Furthermore, we know of no
research that would provide definitive support for that assertion. The logic
however, seems to us to support the assumption that Reagan's having been
declared tlie winner would make more people—particularly nonviewers
and tliose unable to identify a winner—consider him tiie winner. Fur
thermore, his recognition as the debate winner mu>- have been taken by-
some as an indication of the competence needed to govern. Winning the
debate also suggested that Reagan was winning the cainpaign, giving un
decided voters a bandwagon that they could climb aboard.
Conclusions and Implications
While the data do not une(juiv(Kall> prove our poirit, thev <Io suggest
that the polls showing that Reagan won the 1980 debate were skewed by
the larger proportion of Reagan supporters in the audience. These sup-
porters—<onscj^ativc Republican activists who participated heaviiv in
other political activities—are likely to have stated that their candidate won,
thus giving Reagan his edge not on the basis of his debate performance
but on the basis of the characteristics of the audience. Tho.se immediate
results reported in the ABC News phone-in survey and in the Associated
Press and CBS News surveys may have affected otiier people so tliat in
creasing proportions of the public came to believe that Reagan had won.
II our theoiy underlying this inteipretation is correct, certain implica
tions for future debates follow:
1. 1 he candi<late with the most supporters in the debate audience is
likely to be considered the winner, all other things being equal. This
Steven H. Chuflee and Jack Dennis, "Presidential Debates: An Empirical As
sessment, mjhe Past and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin Ranney
85 Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1979),
Richard B. Cheney. "The 1976 Presidential Debates: A Republican Perspec-
tive, in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, pp. 127-128. Also see Fred
erick r. Steeper, Public Response to Gerald Ford's Statements on Eastern Europe
in the Second Debate, in 1 he Presidential Debates: Media, Electoral and Policy
Perspectives, eds. George F. Bishop, Robert G. Meadow and Marilvn Jackson-Beeck
{New York: Praeger, 1978). pp. 81-101.
■''' Carter Is Bullish Despite Polls," The Philadelphia Bullelin. .31 Oct. 1980, p.
A® ].
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means that a candidate with a substantial lead in the polls is likely
to be considered die winner, and to profit the most, if he performs as
well as his opponent.
2. If the numbers of supporters of each candidate are equal, the candi
date with the most intense supporters is likely to be considered the
winner. The intense supporters will be more likely to watch and to
declare their candidate the winner,
3. If the numbers of supporters are equal, the conservative Republican
candidate is likely to be declared the winner, because his conserva
tive Republican supporters will be more active, and this activity will
include watching the <lebates and declaring their candidate the win
ner.
While this analysis does not enhance the myth of presidential debates as
grand devices for inlonning the electorate, tlie.se implications do provide
strategic infonnation to campaign planners, interpretive information to the
news media, and explanatory infonnation to the rest of us—the over 100
million viewers of televised presidential debates.
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FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FIVE FORMATS
USED IN THE 1980 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES
Susan A. Hellweg and Steven L, Phillips
The presidential debates have become an important part of American
politics It has been repeatedly demonstrated that these debates are
viewed l)y a considerable number of people' and have an important impact
upon voting decisions/ The fact that they have aciiuired such importance
has lead political scientists, mass media specialists, and communication
researchers to study them in great detail/
Since the debates appear to influence voters in making up their minds
about candidates, much has been written about their formats, specifically,
concerning their ability to allow for the adequate dissemination of appro
priate information to the American public and their ability to provide a fair
vehicle to tlie candidates who art* endeavoring to convey their political
messages.' A varietv' of recommendations have been made in regard to
how the fonnat of these debates could be improved, with no particular
consensus on an "ideal" fomiat in sight.'
The purpose of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of the
1980 presidential debate formats. Five debates in particular will be incor-
porated in this discussion, specifically the Republican primary debates
held in Iowa, South Carolina, and Te.vas, and the two major post-conven
tion debates in Baltimore and Cleveland.®
Susan Hellweg is an A.ssistant Dean for Acadeniie Aflairs in the College of Profes
sional Studies and Fine Arts and an Assistant Professor of Speech CoinmunicaHon
at San Diego Stale Universitv . Steven Phillips is a graduate student in tlie Depart
ment of Speech Communication at San Diego State University.
'See, for e.Kample, Frank Stanton, "An Appeal to the American People" TV
Guide, Jaiuiaiy 14-20, 196], p. 26; and John P. Rol>inson. "The Polls" in The Great
Dehate.s: Carter c.s'. Ford, 1976, ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington: [ndiana Universitv
Press. 1979). pp. 262-268.
- See, for example. Steven H. Chaffee, "Presidential Debates—Are They Helpful
to Voters? Communication Monographs, 45 (1978), .330-346.
® See. for example. Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Background—Per
spective—Effects (Kennedy vs. .N'ixonl (Bloomington; Iiuliana University Press
1962); KVaus. The Great Debates (Carter-Ford); and Llovd Bitzer and Theo<lore
Kueter. Carter vs. Ford: The Counterfeit Debates of J97(i (Madison: Universitv of
Wisconsin Press, 1980). " '
' See, for example, Jim Karayn, "Presidential Debates; A Plan for the Future," in
The Great Debates (Carter-Ford), pp. 209-219; Bitzeraiui Rueter, Carter ts. Ford,
pp. 103-2.50; Sidney Kraus. "Presidential Debates in 19fS4," Quarterhf Journal of
Speech, .50 (1964), 19-23; Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover, "Presidential De
bates: An Overview." in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin
Ranney (Washington; American Enteriirise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1J79), pp. 191-214; and David Sendler, "A New Plan for Presidential Debates " TV
Guide, March 8, 1980, pp. 4-10.
' See Bitzer and Rueter, Carter vs. Ford, p. 225, as well as other sources cited in
note 4.
" The two televised debates excluded from this analvsis are the ones held in New
Hampshire and Illinois among the Republican primary contenders. These omis-
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The televised presidential debates of 1960. 1976, and 1980 have provid
ed the American public an alternative source of information about the
candidates. The.se events have allowed the public to view opposing can
didates in a single context simultaneously. Through these debates, the
voters have had the opportunity to see the candidates for an extended
period of time. Only through television programs such as "Meet the Press,
"Face the Nation," or "Issues and Answers" does the public otherwise
have the opportunit\' to see a candidate discuss his positions at length.
Nightly news media coverage, for example, does not alford the viewer this
opportunity. The debates, however, have allowed the public to compare
candidates. , . i- ..u
In addition, these debates have not only served as a means to mtonn the
electorate, but thev probably have also elevated the quality ot public dia
logue. From the standpoint of campaign expenditures, tliese debates have
most likely given the candidates tlie opportunity to speak to the large.st
and most attentive audience at the least expense; as the cost of campaign
traveling increases, these debates will become even more important in
their function.
A debate may be defined as a t>pe of discourse involving two or more
persons who offer competing positions in regard to a particular issue or
issues. This discourse normally involves the alTinnation and denial ol a
proposition in some or all respects by contenders through the use ol sup
porting argumentation. In designing the format for a televised presidential
debate, a number of important factors must be taken into consideration.
Each of these factors greatly influences the (luality of such debates and
has particularK alfectcd the three series of presidential debates held since
I960.
First, dei>ates do not serve the public well when the\' simply encourage
candidates to "score" against one another, rather than actually debate. This
tendency in past televised debates has resulted in part from the tormats
which have made the events appear like "boxing matches and in part
because of the way in which the media has cn\ ered tliem. In an at^mipt
to interpret these events, the media has sometimes relied upon a "winner-
loser" orientation.
Another potential problem occurs when the debate tonnat encourages
short answers which resound "worn commonplaces" heard fretjuently in
the campaign." Often absent from these responses are well-developed and
thoughtful arguments. The advantage, of course, to the candidate who can
use packaged c-ommonplaces effectively is that he can deliver his messages
rapidlv in polished fonn, using various tested appeals.
The role of the panelists provides an additional source of potential dii-
ficulty. If the panelists simply pose propositions from which the con
tenders can develop arguments, tlien a true deiiate occurs. The tendency
in past presidential debates has been for the panelists to enter somewhat
of a third party role, taking up quite a bit of time in asking questions,
directing some hostility toward the candidates in the content of tlieirques-
sions, however, should not particularly compromise the generality of the conclu
sions drawn in thi.s study, because the New Hampshire debate fonnat was similar
to the one employed in the Iowa debate and the Illinois formal generally paralleled
the South Carolina debate- . . .. . r d-
' The tenn "worn commonplaces" has been adopted lor this discussion from Bitz-
er and Rueter, Carter v.w Ford, pp. 132-135.
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Honing, and choosing (juestions which do not invite debate. Oftentimes,
panelists' tiuestions have seemed more a reflection of the interest of a
particular panelist tiian general electoral issues. Panelists ha\e freciuently
been guilty ol asking multiple (juestions within the tfainework of a single
question, making it difficult lor a candidate to respoml. The debates have
often seemed more like press conferences than debates, with panelists
asking candidates <iuestions and catididates responding to the questions,
rather than dei)ating one another.
The panelists have serveil as agenda setters for some of the debates,
often pressuring the candidates with hostile or one-sided questions into
subinissive respon.ses, acting as though their role was to '•unmask" the
candidates. In addition, the line of questioning has at times taken some
what of a transitor>' approach, rather than a view toward long-range per
spectives.
On a more technical level, there are fonnat considerations which relate
to speaker Hine. speaker rotation, the use of opening and closing state
ments, the use of rebuttiils and restatement of questions, and the use of
notes b\" the contenders. Although these considerations mav seem trivial
to tl^e casual observer, the candidates properl>- consider them to be vitally
important. OhviousK", a candidate must adapt quickly to the constraints of
the format. This involves realizing the consequences of the particular tie-
bate format chosen. In terms ol speaker rotation, for example, the candidate
must consitler his opportunit\- to delend his own position, to point out the
weaknesses ol the arguments advanced b> his opponent, to generate his
own agentla—all of which must be acctmiplished with agility and proper
tactics.
The 1980 presidential campaign offered an expanded version of the 1960
and 1976 debates. In this case, there was an effort to provide the American
public with primaiy debates, as well as post-convention presidctitial de
bates. There were no Democratic primaiy debates (due to President Car
ter s insistence that his foreign affairs respoirsibilities prevented his par-
Hcipation), but five Republican leleviserl primaiy debates ditl materialize.
The Republicans, with seven viable candidates announcing their inten
tion to nin for the Presidency (in contrast to three Democratic contenders),
endeavored to assist voters in making distinctions between candidates (and
offer them nationwide visibility) through a series of five primaiy debates
between Januaiy and April 1980 in various American cities. This was an
important decision because the incumbent President was a Democrat, and
some of the seven Republican contenders were relativcK' unknown to a
nationwide audience.
Republican primary debates were televised from Iowa, New Hampshire,
Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas, with some, but not all, of the candi
dates appearing in each. All seven candidates appeared in at least one of
these speaking e\ eMts. The general aim, of course, of each of these can
didates was to stand out among the others and yet participate in solidifying
the Repulilican Piuty."
Two post-convention pre.siclential debates were sponsored by the Lea
gue of Women Voters—tlie first between Republican candidate Ronald
Reagan and independent candidate John Anderson in Baltimore (Presi-
tlent Carter withdrawing from the debate) and the second between Dein-
" John Anderson, of course, eventually parted from his Republican colleagues, but
he continued to contrihute to the image of a united Republican Party unHl the
Illinois debate.
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ocratic candidate Jimmy Carter and Republican candidate Ronald Reagan
in Cleveland (Anderson being eliminated from the debate because of an
insufficient ranking in the political polls).®
The Iowa Debate
The Iowa Republican Debate, the first in the series of five televised
primaiA' debates, was held on Januan.' 5, 1980 at the Des Moines Civic
Center. Six Republican candidate.s participated in the event: Congressman
Philip Crane, Senator Howard Baker, Congressman John Anderson, former
Governor John Connally, Senator Robert Dole, and former Ambassador
George Bush. James Gannon of the Des- Moines Register and Tribune
served as the im)derator. The panelists included two local journalists and
two national journalists: Richard Doak of the Des Moines Tribune. Ma^
McGrorv' of the Washington Star, George Anthan of the Des Moines Regis
ter and Tribune, and WiiJter Mears of the Associated Press.
The two-hour debate featured tlie following question and answer format:
(1) In the initial segment, panelists took hums asking the candidates (jues-
tions, with the first candidate getting two tninutes to answer, then each of
the other five candidates getting one minute to respond or comment on
the (luestion. (2) In the second segment, audience members asked the
candidates (luestions, with each candidate getting one minute to respond.
(3) In the third segment, the audience members asked questions of single
candidates, with die candidate addressed getting one minute to respond.
(4) In the final segment, each of the si.\ candidates was given the oppor-
hinitv for a three-minute closing statement.
Ten questions were posed by the panelists in the initial eight>-minute
segment. Four of the six candidates were initial respondents for two (lues-
tions, while the other two candidates did so only once (Dole and Bush).
The second and diird segments (audience questions) lasted approximately
twenty minutes, with two questions asked by audience members of all the
candidates and eight que.stions asked of individual candidates. Dole and
Bush were provided witli one more audience member question in the third
segment than the others. The final segment, consisting of closing state
ments b\- the candidates, lasted eighteen minutes.
Generally speaking, all the candidates were treated equally, with the
exception of the Dole-Bush questioning noted for the first and third seg
ments. Because the additional questions to Bush and Dole in the third
segment comi>ensated for tlie first segment, the total available speaking
time for each candidate was tlie same—eighteen minutes. Candidates were
rotated in terms of .speaking order, so that the initial respondent was dif
ferent through each group of six que.stions.
The format provided for a relatively fonnal presentation, although there
was some levity evidenced. No audience applause was pemiltted in re
sponse to candidate comments. The candidates sat behind tables (three at
a table), so as to appear as members of a panel discussion rather than
individual speakers. The moderator was positioned between the two
groups of candidates. The four journalists faced the candidates ami the
moderator, with their backs to tlie audience,
Developing an effective debate format around six candidates is, of
® The following analysis of debate formats is based upon video-tapes of the tele
vised broadcasts.
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course, difficult. Because of the inflexible stnicture of the debate and the
routine questioning, it was difficult to distingui.sli the Republican candi
dates, who were iiot only tr\ing to stand apart froin the others, but also
aiming to solidify their party. The albiwance for some levity and infor-
malit) did provide for some escape from traditional, "packaged" expres
sion without sacrificing the serious intent of the debate Itself. The number
of questions raised did afford a wide variet\' of topics to be discussed, so
that a comparison (at least to some degree) of the candidates was possible.
The South Carolina Debate
The South Carolina Republican Debate, the third in the series of tele
vised primary debates, was held on Februar>- 28, 1980 in the Longstreet
Theater on the campus of the University of South Carolina in Columbia.
Four Republican candidates participated in the event: former Governor
Ronald Reagan, Baker, Connally, aiid Bush. Jim Lehrer of the Public
Broadcasting System moderated the affair, which included four panelists
(again, two local journalists and two national journalists); Jack Gennond of
the Wa.'ilnnfiton Star, Lee Bandy of The State and The Columbian Rec
ord, William Raspberr> of the Washington Post, and Kent Krell of The
Columbian Record.
In contrast to all of the other 1980 debates analyzed here, the South
Carolina clebate featured the participants in a setting that approximated a
boxing ring, with the audience surrounding them and successively ele
vated. Two of the candidates sat on opposite sides of the stage, with the
other two on the tliird side, all evenly spaced with regard to one another.
The journalists divided evenly and sat in the proximity of the two of the
corners with tables in front of them; the moderator sat with a small lecturn
and table in front of him between the groups <jf panelists. The participants
were positione<l essentially in a circular pattern. The appearance was
somewhat informal; the intent seemed to be to make the event seem con
versational, rather than adversarial.
The following cpiestion and answer format was imposed: (1) In the initial
segment, the journalists asked the caiulidates ciuestions, with the first re
spondent given two minutes to answer and subsequent candidates given
one minute to respond or comment on the riuestion (as was the case in the
Iowa debate). (2) In the second segment, each panelist directed a different
(juestion to each of the four contenders, the candidates having one minute
to respond. (3) In the third segment, the moderator addressed fbllow-up
questions to the candidates (tvi'o successiveK to each candidate) with each
candidate lun ing one minute to respond. (4) In the final segment, the four
candidates had tlu^ opportunity to offer two-minute closing statements.
Fight (luestions were asked in the initial segment. Each candiclate was
the initial respondent for Kvo of these questions. Sixteen (juestions were
posed in the second segment, four by each jounialist, wHh one from each
joumalist to each candidate. The third segment featured eight fbllow-up
ciuestions, with two lor each of the lour contenders. Finally, all candidates
gave a closing statement. A total of eighteen minutes of speaking time was
provided to each candidate, as was the case in the Iowa debate.
No audience questions were utilized in the South Carolina debate. Fol
low-up questions, however, were an additional feature. The questions
posed in the South Carolina debate had slightly more intimidating and
personalized overtones than those in the Iowa debate, such as the ques
tioning directed at Bush al>out his handling of tlie New Hampshire debate.
Tlie follow-up questions posed by the moderator and the ciuestions posed
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by the journalists during the second segment were directed generally at
concerns associated with the particular candidate involved.
Because there were only tour candidates instead of six (as was the case
in the Iowa debate) it was easier for viewers to make distinctions among
the contenders. The format, however, was rather structured, so that it was
difficult for the candidates to really debate one another; they were forced
into simply attempting to answer the specific tiuestions posed by journal
ists and moderator.
While informutixe, the debate seemed to serve the purpose oi a press
conference, the principal advantage being that the viewers had an oppor
tunity to contrast answers among candidates to certain questions. Gener
ally speaking, tire challenges given to candidates were provided by those
asking the questions, not the other contenders. The allowance, once again,
for some degree of informality lent to the lessening of an otherwise stiff
performance by candidates.
The Texas Debate
The Texas Republican Debate, the fifth in the series of televised primary
debates, was held on April 23, 1980 at the Albert Thomas Convention
Center in Houston. The two remaining Republican candidates participated
in the event: Ronald Reagan and George Bush, two conteiulcrs who were
later, of course, to join as Republican running mates against the Carter-
Mon'dale ticket. News correspondent Howard K. Smith moderated the de
bate; there was no panel of (luestioners for this debate.
Tiie Texas debate oft'ered strong contrast to the other debates in
volved in this analysis. The moderator played, on the whole, a minimal
role in the interaction between the two candidates. The format for the
sixt>'-minute debate pnwided for relatively open discussion and freedom
of direction. Subjects were generally initiated b\ the moderator, although
candidates were free to address questions to one another.
There were no limitations on candidate speaking time during the debate.
The only e.xception was a one-minute limitation imposed upon each can
didate for liis closing sLitement. Just prior to these statervients, the can
didates were given four {juestions from the audience. At the beginning of
the debate the audience was pennitted to react audibly to comments of
the candidates, but at an early point in the program the moderator advised
the audience against reacting to the proceedings. Apparently the format
was designed so that (to the degree possible) the debate would appear as
a conversation between Reagan and Bush tor the benefit of the viewing
audience. The staging of the debate, however, was relatively tonnal. The
candidates stood behind podiums on tlie stage with the moderator between
them.
As it turned out, Reagan provided t\xent>'-six candidate mespges tor a
total of approximately twenty-five and a half minutes; Bush offered eigh
teen candidate messages for a total of approximately nineteen and a hiilf
minutes. Bv not structuring the candidate message plan, Reagan seized
the opportunity to speak six more minutes than Bush. However, this was
due in piut to some questions from the moderator to Reagan about the
accuracy of figures he had used in campaign presentations.
Because of the lack of a restricting structure, the candidates had ample
time to convey their positions, could attack arguments presented by the
opponent, and clarify misconceptions about themselves. This type of for
mat, basically non-directive, seems to allow for maximal content on issues,
particularly when the moderator simply presents topics for discussion, al-
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most in the sense oi stating debatable propositions. It is important to note,
however, that because the candidates held similar positions on almost
every issue, the debate became only minimally confrontational.
The Baltimore Debate
The Baltimore Debate, the first of two post-convention presidential de
bates, was held on September 21. 1980 in the Baltimore Convention Cen
ter. Two presidential caiKli<late.s were present: Ronald Reagan and John
Antierson. Bill Movers of the Public Broadcasting System moderated the
program. The format included a panel of six journali.sts: Carol Loomis of
Forttmc Magazine; Daniel Greenberg, a syndicated columnist; Charles
Corddry of the Baltiinore Sun; Lee May of the Lo.s- Angeles Times; Jane
Bryant Quinn of Newsiceek Magazine; and Soma Golden of the New York
Times.
The one-hour debate featured the following (piestion and answer format:
(1) Six ciuestions were asked of the candidates by the six Journalists. (2)
The initial respondent (candidate A) was given two and a half minutes to
provide an answer. (3) The journalist involved then restated the question.
(4) the second respondent (candidate B) was then given two and a half
minutes to answer the question. (5) Candiilate A was given one minute
and fifteen seconds to respond. (6) Candidate B was then given one
minute and fifteen seconds to respond. Anderson and Reagan alternated
in terms of being the first to respond to a question. Following the six
questions, each candidate was provided the opportunity for a three-minute
closing statement. Each candidate was, therefore, given twenty-seven min
utes to convey his positions.
In contrast to the other debates discussed thus far, this one offered only
six questions, po.ssibly minimizing the number of issues which could be
brought forth in the interaction. This debate did not feature follow-up
questions. Apparently because (luestioning was confined to this restrictive
format, panelists addressetl multiple (luestions to the candidates within
the framework of single questions. Rebuttals were possible, however, with
four messages (two per candidate) emerging for each (juestion. Some of
the questions were rather one-sided and limiting. This debate was quite
fonnal in staging, with the two candidates standing behind podiums and
the panel of jounialists and the moderator together facitjg the candidates,
their backs to the audience.
The Cleveland Debate
The Cleveland Democratic-Republican Debate was held on October 28,
1980 (one week before the General Election) in the Cleveland Convention
Center. Two presidential candidates participated: President Jimmy Carter
and former Governor Ronald Reagan. The program included a panel of
four journalists: Marvin Stone of U.S. Netvs and World Report, Harry Elli.s
of the Christian Science Monitor, William Hilliard of the Port/and Ore-
gonian, ami Barbara Walters of ABC News. Howard K. Smith moderated
the debate.
The ninety-minute debate featured a complex question and answer for
mat; (1) In the initial segment, various questions were posed by the jour
nali.sts to the candidates, with the (juestion going to candidate A, then a
response from candidate A, then a follow-up question, then a resjxni.se
from candidate A. At this point the question was restated to candidate B,
followed by a re.sponse from candidate B, a follow-up question, then a
response from candidate B. Finally, a rebuttal was presented by each can-
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didate (first from candidate A and then from candidate B). (2) In the second
segment, the same procedure was used, witli the omission of follow-up
questions. (3) In the final segment, three-minute closing statements were
provided by each candidate. As witli the Baltimore debate, time limitations
were imposed upon all speaking opportunities of the candidates.
Each question in the first and second parts oi the debate otfered the
candidates each three opportunities to speak. Rebuttals were a feature of
the first two debate segments, follow-up (juestions were only a feature of
the initial segment. Two rebuttals per candidate were possible in the sec
ond segment because an additional rebuttal replaced the follow-up ques
tion that had been included in the first segment of the debate.'"
Four principal questions were posed in the initial segment, ei\ch accom
panied bv a follow-up question. In the second segment, another fonr ques
tions were asked. In essence, then, eight principal questions were posed
bv the journalists, two by each panelist. Once again, the journalists were
uiiable to resist the temptation to fonnulate multiple questions within a
format that required single questions.
The format of the Reagan-Carter debate created an extremely fonnal
atmosphere similar to that found in the Reagan-Anderson debate. Both of
these forums were staged in the trailition of the presidential debates of
1960 and 1976. The panelists and the moderator in the Clevelantl debate
foced the two candidates, with their backs to the audience. The two con
tenders stood behind podiums on the stage with a blue curtain behind
them. No audience reaction was pennitted during the course of the debate.
Candidates were allowed to use only those notes that they composed dur
ing the course of die debate.
The advantages of follow-up questions and rebuttals were evidenced in
the information provided in the tlebate by the candidates. Though the
panelists' (luestions were catalytic in nature, there still was a sense that
the candidates were answering the journalists' questions, rather than de
bating one another. This debate offered the candidates substantially more
speaking time than did the one in Baltimore; the Cleveland debate was
ninety minutes in length, the Baltimore debate was sixty minutes in length.
Summary
The purpose of this article has been to compiu-e and contrast the formats
employed in five of the 1980 presidential debates and to thus discuss the
issue of debate fonnats in general.
Since the format imposed upon a debate can affect the presentation of
infomiation provided to viewers and since the presidential debates have
become a significant event in the campaign process, it is important to
analyze various optional formats and to consider carefully formats which
are developed for future such encounters.
Upon examination of the 1980 debates, the range of fonnats becomes
clear. The rigidity and stmcture of the two post-convention debates seem
in line with the importance of those bipartisan events. The earlier Repub
lican primary debates would seem to have the luxuiy of being more flexible,
experimental, and informal. The potential for confrontation, however, was
inherently less among the various Republican candidates in the primary
For an outline of this unusually complex debate format, see Table 3 of Myles
Martel's essay, "Debate Preparations in the Reagan Camp: An Insider's View,
which appears in this issue of Speaker and Cavel.
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elections. Conversely, the greater potential for confrontation was present
in the bipartisan debates, but not fully realized because of the rigid format.
It is difficult to determine which debate format offered the most infor
mation to its viewers. Some of these debate fonnats provided for interfer
ence b> the panelists. Indeed, the panelists almost became third parties
in some forums. The Te.xas debate certainly offered the candidates the
most freedom from interference by panelists. In u few debates, intimidat
ing questions per\'aded the forums, producing defensive and evasive re
sponses from the candidates. Worn commonplaces were an outcome, to
some degree, in each of the debates. In all cases except the Texas de
bate, the restricted fonuat and the absence of clearly stated propositions
caused the candidates to be more concerned with answering a journalist's
(jucstions than actually debating one another.
In making recommendations for future debates, several considerations
emerge. These events need to be designed in such a way as to minimize
the involvement of panelists beyojid what is necessary to pose propositions
through their questions. Panelists certainK' should be discouraged from
using intimidating or multiple-faceted (luestions, as these cannot be trans
lated iiito clear and fairly stated propositions. The "shot-gun" presentation
of questions used in press conferences does not seem preferable in de
bates. The debate questions should be simple, short, and direct. Ideally,
each (question ought to clearly imply a debatable proposition.
Multiple (questions emerged particularly in the two post-convention de
bates; at the same time, the formats of these debates allowed for fewer
opportunities to pose a question than in the primary debates. Obviously,
a type of trade-off occurred in the 1980 debates: freijuent questions created
shorter response times and encouraged a press conference format; less
frequent questions encouraged the panelists to hide several (piestions
within the guise of a single question and that made it very difficult for
the candidates to present responsi\e answers within a set time frame.
Regrettably, questions in most of the debates analvzed here were often
tailored to the initial respondent. This lead to one-sided <iuestioning which
discouraged a genuine debate among the candidates. Obviously, this prac
tice needs to be avoided in future debate formats.
Future debates also need to be designed so as to minimize the stiff
qualit) of past debates, Such a change might lessen the tendency of the
press and the public at large to view the debates as contests between
candidates to see who is the most facile.
Closing statements apiDear to be an effective device for summarizing
what has taken place. Opening statements offer another opportunit\' for
setting the tone of the debate. Opening statements were employed in two
of the four Kennedy-Nixon debates in 1960 and in the 1976 Vice Presi
dential debate between Walter Mondale anil Robert Dole. Certainlv. the
restatement of questions was a positive innovation in the 1980 debates, as
it refocused attention on the query, helped avoid ambiguitv and fostered
a debate on the proposition implicit in the question.
Finally, allowing tlie moderator to introduce various propositions for
mulated in advance during the debate itself has been sugge.sted by several
scholars as a way to improve the debate fonnats." In this way, the con-
"Germoncl and Witcover, •'Presidential Debates: An Overview" p 201- and
Kraus, "PresideiiHal Debates in 1964," p. 22.
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tenders might debate more with one another, with the propositions being
the vehicle for initiating interaction, rather than questions, and with the
moderator monitoring the interaction, rather than a panelist of journalists,
who have had a tendency to play too large a role in the process of presi
dential debating.
The experience of presidential campaign debates in 1980 has provided
a wider range of formats from which to choose or modify in the future. The
forums in Iowa and New Hampshire provided models for incorporating
six or seven candidates into a debate format, while the South Carolina and
Illinois debates provided for four contenders. The most interesting contrast
in formats occurred between the traditional two-person debates in Balti
more and Cleveland an<l the innovative two-person debate in Texas. Of
course, any format can be misused or abused—whether by the candidates,
the moderator, or the panelists. The goal is not to find a 'perfect format
for presidential debates, but rather to develop appropriate and productive
formats for different campaign situations. Given the innovations of the
1980 forums, there is reason to hope that future presidential debates will
employ improved formats and that public argument—however imperfect-
will continue to play an important role in American politics.
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